










AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE
PROPOSED COAST GUARD USER FEE ON












SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Of TMIS PAGE ,-»*•» Data Bntararf)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
i report numSFR 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.
4. T|TlI >ird Julmi.'tj
An Analysis of the Effects of the
Proposed Coast Guard User Fee on the




» PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME ANO AOORESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940





1 RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBEl
5 TYPE OF 1!90«? ft OERIOO COVERED
Master ' s The sis;
June 198 2
• • PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NuMSER
• CONTRACT OR 3«A« T NUMBCRf*)
10. PROGRAM CLEMENT. PROJECT Tas*AREA * WORK UNIT NUMBERS
12 REPORT DATE
June 1982
1} NUMBER OF PAGES
150
Tl MONITORING AGENCY NAME i AOORESSYI/ dlttanmt from C antral ling Oitieu) is. security class, tat tin* '•»©»•»)
Unclassified
ISa. DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWNGMAOIMGSCHEDULE
l». DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT at hit Xipert)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (at tha *a*rracf »nft« In Block 30, II aittarmni tram Xaporl)
'• SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES




• arr anal tmamtttr my alocM nimimav)
20. ABSTRACT rCan«mn> an rmvma* itda II *«<*«tarr m»4 idamitty »r aio«* MaiMrJ
This study is an analysis of the effects the proposed
Coast Guard user fee of March 1982 will have on the U.S.
Merchant Marine engaged in international trade. The analy-
sis concentrates on the effect the fee will have on the
profitability of the firms in the industry. From this
analysis, conclusions are drawn as to the effect the fee
will have on the ability of firms and ships to remain in
do ,:
FORM
AN 71 1473 EDITION OF I MOV •• IS OBSOLETE





foeumr* CL*lH>'C«Tiaii o* twit mi/w.» n».« j,.*~,«
the industry. A case study approach is used. Background
material on U.S. Merchant: Marine history, Federal govern-
ment subsidy programs, and economic theories relevant to









Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
An Analysis of the Effects of the Proposed Coast Guard
User Fee on the Oceangoing U.S. Merchant Marine
by
James C. Perry
Lieutenant Commander, United States Coast Guard
B.A., Inter American University, 1976
and
John T. O'Connor
Lieutenant, United States Coast Guard
B.S., The United States Coast Guard Academy, 1974
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






This study is an analysis of the effects the proposed
Coast Guard user fee of March 1982 will have on the U.S.
Merchant Marine engaged in international trade. The analy-
sis concentrates on the effect the fee will have on the
profitability of the firms in the industry. From this
analysis, conclusions are drawn as to the effect the fee
will have on the ability of firms and ships to remain in
the industry. A case study approach is used. Background
material on U.S. Merchant Marine history,. Federal government
subsidy programs, and economic theories relevant to ocean




A. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND USER FEES . . 12
B. PROBLEM 14
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY 15
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER SUMMARIES . 17
II. THE MERCHANT MARINE HISTORY 20
A. INTRODUCTION 2
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE 2
C. SUMMARY 2 7
III. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE U.S. MARITIME
INDUSTRY 2 8
A. INTRODUCTION 2 3
B. THE REASON 2 3
C. FISCAL AID PROGRAMS 30
1. The Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS) 30
2. The Construction Differential Subsidy
(CDS) 32
3. Tax Subsidies 36
4. Discriminatory Duty Taxes 39
5. Federal Ship Financing Program 40
D. NON-FISCAL AID PROGRAMS 40
1. Cabotage Laws 41
2. Cargo Preference Laws 42

3. Restriction of National Registry to
Locally Built Vessels ......... 44
4. Bilateral Agreements 44
5. U.S.C.G. and Corps of Engineers Services 44
E. SUMMARY 45
IV. THE SHIPS AND FIRMS OF THE OCEANGOING U.S.
MERCHANT MARINE 4 6
A. INTRODUCTION 4 6
B. FLEET PROFILE 4 6
V. THE OCEAN SHIPPING MARKETPLACE 5 3
A. INTRODUCTION 5 3
B. OCEAN SHIPPING SERVICE 5 3
C. CHARTER SERVICE 54
D. LINER SERVICE 5 5
E. THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE 6 3
1. U.S. Liner Trades 6 4
2. U.S. Tramp Trade 66
3. Competition Between U.S. Liner Firms . . 67
F. SUMMARY 68
VI. THE USER FEE IDEA 70
A. INTRODUCTION 70
B. BACKGROUND 7
C. SUMMARY 7 5
VII. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 7 6
A. INTRODUCTION 7 6
B. SHIPPING COMPANY SELECTION 76
C. METHODOLOGY 7 7
6

D. CALCULATION OF FEE COSTS 7 8
E. APPLICATION OF TOTAL FEE COSTS 7 9
F. PRICE INDEX 80
G. QUESTIONS 84
VIII. CASE STUDIES 86
A. INTRODUCTION 36
B. DELTA STEAMSHIP LINES INC 37
1. Company Background 87
2. Comments of Company Official 87
3. Vital Operating Data 91
C. AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD 96
1. Company Background 96
2. Comments by American President Lines
Official 97
3. Vital Operating Data 9 8
D. MOORE MCCORMACK LINES INC 101
1. Background 101
2. Comments by Company Official 102
3. Vital Operating Data 104
E. LYKES BROTHERS STEAMSHIP COMPANY, INC, ... 107
1. Company Background 107
2. Comments of Company Official 107
3. Vital Operating Data 107
F. MOORE-MCCORMACK BULK TRANSPORT, INC 110
1. Company Background 110
2. Comments of Company Officials Ill

3. Vital Operating Data 112
G. THE BERGER GROUP 114
1. Background and Comments 114
2. Vital Operating Data 115
H. KEYSTONE SHIPPING COMPANY 117
1. Background 117
2. Company Comments 117
3. Vital Operating Data 113
I. SEA-LAND SERVICES, INC 119
1. Background 119
2. Comments of Sea-Land Company Official . 120
3. Vital Operating Data . . * 123
J. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MERCHANT SHIPPING . . 12 5
K. COUNCIL OF AMERICAN-FLAG SHIP OPERATORS . . 126
IX. ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 128
A. INTRODUCTION 128
3. GENERAL 128
C. THE LINER TRADE 130
D. U.S. BULK CHARTER TRADE 133
E. SUMMARY 141
X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 142
A. CONCLUSIONS 142
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 143
LIST OF REFERENCES 145
BIBLIOGRAPHY 146




I. Major Merchant Fleets of the World—January
1980 26
II. U.S. Oceanborne Foreign Trade Tonnage (in
millions) 27
III. ODS Outlays—January 1, 1937 to September 30
,
1980 33
IV. CDS Outlays— 1936 to 1980 37
V. Federal Ship Financing Guarantees (liability
on September 30, 1980) 41
VI. Employment of U.S. -Flag Oceangoing Fleet
September 30, 1980 47
VII. U.S. Oceangoing Merchant Marine—September
30, 1980 50
Firms Operating U.S. Flag Vessels 51
Theoretical Cost Structure of Ship Operation 57
Demand Curve for Liner Service 61
United States Merchant Marine Position in
World Shipping 64
Proposed Direct User Fee Charges 74
Coast Guard Operating Expenses 1973 Through
1980 81
Proposed Coast Guard Operating Expenses 1932 82
User Fees for 1978 Through 1980 Adjusted for
Inflation 83
Delta Lines Abbreviated Income Statement . . 91
Delta Lines Balance Sheet 92













XIX. Delta Lines Trade Routes 1973 Through 1980 . 94
XX. Delta Lines Accrued Operating-Differential
Subsidies 95
XXI. Annual Fee Costs to Delta Lines 95
XXII. American President Lines Abbreviated Income
Statement 98
XXIII. American President Lines Balance Sheet ... 99
XXIV. The American President Lines Fleet 1978
Through 1980 99
XXV. American President Lines Trade Routes 1978
Through 1980 100
XXVI. APL Accrued Operating-Differential Subsidies 100
XXVII. Annual Fee Costs to APL 101
XXVIII. Moore-McCormack Lines Income Data 104
XXIX. Moore-McCormack Lines Balance Sheet Data . . 10 4
XXX. The Moore-McCormack Lines Fleet 1978 Through
1980 105
XXXI. Moore-McCormack Trade Routes 1978 Through
1980 105
XXXII. Moore-McCormack Lines Accrued Operating-
Differential Subsidies 106
XXXIII. Annual Fee Costs to Moore-McCormack Lines . . 106
XXXIV. Lykes Brothers Steamship Company Income Data 108
XXXV. The Lykes Fleet 1979 Through 1930 103
XXXVI. Lykes Trade Routes 1979 Through 1980 .... 109
XXXVII. Lykes Accrued Operating-Differential
Subsidies 109
XXXVIII. Annual Fee Costs to Lykes 110
XXXIX. Moore-McCormack Bulk Transport Income Data . 113
10

XL. The Moore-McCormack Oceangoing Tanker Fleet
1973 Through 1980 113
XLI. Moore-McCormack Bulk Operating-Differential
Subsidies 114
XLII. Annual Fee Costs to Moore-McCormack for
Tanker Operations 114
XLII I. The Berger Group Fleet 1978 Through 1980 . . 116
XLIV. Berger Group Accrued Operating-Differential
Subsidies 116
XLV. Annual Fee Costs to Berger Group 116
XLVI. The Keystone Fleet 1978 Through 1980 .... 118
XLVII. Keystone Accrued Operating-Differential
Subsidies 118
XLVII I. Annual Fee Costs to Keystone 119
XLIX. Sea-Land Services Abbreviated Income
Statement ..... 123
L. Other Sea-Land Services Business Data .... 123
LI. The Sea-Land Services Non-Coastal Fleet 1973
Through 1980 124
LII. Sea-Land Services Foreign Trade Routes 1978
Through 1980 124
LIII. Annual Fee Costs to Sea-Land 125
LIV. Increase in Liner Revenues for 1930 as
Compared with 1978 133
LV. Liner Company Return on Assets 197 8 Through
1980 133





A. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND USER FEES
Shortly after taking office in January of 19 81 the Rea-
gan administration submitted to the Congress a program to
revitalize the economy of the United States. Included in
this program was a plan to recover the costs of many govern-
ment services by funding them from user charges rather than
from general tax revenues.
The primary purpose of this aspect of the Reagan program
is to relieve the general taxpayer of the burden of the
costs of services that primarily benefit a small number of
individuals and firms. This program also seeks to achieve
economic efficiency. Charges to users will create an incen-
tive for them to request services at a level at which bene-
fits exceed or at least equal the cost. In addition, the
administration claims the user charge will provide an incen-
tive for the user to monitor the public agency providing the
service and encourage it to operate efficiently.
As part of this program the United States Department of
Transportation established the policy that its programs
should be financed, wherever possible, through charges levied
directly on the user or immediate beneficiary of the service.
Charges will reflect full Federal costs and will be based on
12

the extent and character of each individual's or firm's use
of the service.
The United States Coast Guard is an agency of the U.S.
Department of Transportation. The estimated costs of Coast
Guard operations will exceed 1.3 billion dollars in 1982.
Almost all of its services are provided to a small segment
of the public without charge. These services include li-
censing, inspection, vessel documentation, operation of aids
to navigation, search rescue and towing assistance, ice-
breaking, and water pollution monitoring and cleanup, among
others
.
While the Nebraska farmer, and those like him that do
not receive measurable benefits from the aforementioned ser-
vices, can reasonably be expected to help pay for the Coast
Guard's contribution to national defense and law enforcement,
it is unreasonable that they should subsidize the costs of
services that only a small number of yachtsmen, fishermen
and ship owners now enjoy free of charge.
Pursuant to the Administration's policy to limit Federal
transportation outlays a proposal, currently being developed,
will be submitted by the Coast Guard to the Congress to re-
cover the cost of certain services not related to military
or law enforcement missions (i.e. navigation aids, search




During recent years a great deal of attention has been
focused on the condition of the U.S. oceangoing Merchant
Marine. Technical publications and journals related to the
United States Navy and U.S. maritime industries, the popular
press, and television have all presented articles or pro-
grams expressing concerns over the ability of the U.S.
oceangoing merchant marine to survive as an industry. Con-
cern for the U.S. oceangoing Merchant Marine arises because
this industry figures in the security requirements of the
nation and is a source of employment to many workers. In-
terest in the Merchant Marine has also been evident in the
Federal Government. In the Forward to the Annual Report of
the Maritime Administration for Fiscal Year 1979, Samuel B.
Nemirow, then Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime
Affairs, expresses this interest:
The period covered in MARAD 1979 has been marked by unpre-
cedented administrative and legislative initiatives to
bolster the U.S. maritime industry. . . . Coincidentally
(but not too surprisingly) the 1970s ended as they began
—
with an intensive, far reaching re-evaluation of the U.S.
maritime industry.
Concern about the ability to compete is reflected in
substantial subsidies to the Merchant Marine from the Federal
Government. The subsidies take the form of direct monetary
and indirect non-monetary aids. The majority of these
Federal aids to the industry have existed for many years.
Recent initiatives to bolster the Merchant Marine suggest
14

this aid was not enough. Based on the long standing prac-
tice of the Federal aid to the industry and based on the
interest in the nation during the 1970s to bolster the in-
dustry, it is appropriate to determine the effects of
charging the Merchant Marine a fee for services provided by
the U.S. Coast Guard.
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY
The purpose of this study is to analyze the potential
effects of a Coast Guard user fee on the U.S. oceangoing
Merchant Marine. The user fee will be based on the costs of
services provided to the U.S. oceangoing Merchant Marine by
the Coast Guard that are currently funded from general
Federal tax revenues.
As indicated, this study deals only with the U.S. ocean-
going Merchant Marine that engages in providing shipboard
transportation service between the U.S. and foreign ports.
All firms in this industry operate United States registered
ships and have American crews. This industry is distinct
from the U.S. Marchant Marine engaged in coastal trade
(transportation between U.S. ports) in that the U.S. ocean-
going Merchant Marine Must compete with firms operating
ships registered in foreign countries and manned by non-U. S.
crews. The U.S. Merchant Marine servicing only U.S. ports
does not face this foreign competition.
15

In March 1982, the Coast Guard released a demonstration
fee schedule which included proposed charges to be levied on
the U.S. Merchant Marine. This demonstration fee schedule
is one of the cornerstones of this study. In analyzing the
effects of a user charge on the U.S. oceangoing Merchant
Marine, this fee schedule will be used. Should a user
charge be implemented to recover the cost of Coast Guard
operations it is assumed it will not differ materially from
this proposal of March 1982.
A study of the effect of charging for government ser-
vices provided to an industry logically leads to questioning
the importance of that industry to the. public. This study
will not attempt to assess the value of the U.S. oceangoing
Merchant Marine to the general public, as it is beyond the
scope of the thesis. Also, any future plans to expand or
contract the Merchant Marine will be given only passing con-
sideration. This study will focus on estimating the effect
of the fee on the firms and ships engaged in the industry
as of April 1982.
As previously indicated, the U.S. oceangoing Merchant
Marine is a heavily subsidized industry. The analysis in
this study will consider the various aid programs in effect
as of April 1982. No attempt will be made to recommend
changes to the various aid programs as part of this study.
16

D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER SUMMARIES
This research concentrates on short term profitability
of the firms in the industry. From this approach, conclu-
sions will be drawn regarding the ability of the firms to
stay in the industry and expected changes as to the number
of ships employed in the industry as a result of the pro-
posed Coast Guard user fee. To do this, a case study ap-
proach has been selected. Data was collected for the years
1978 through 1980 on eight of the thirteen firms that make
up the industry. The firms chosen for case study represent
a large cross section of the industry in terms of size,
trade, trade routes, types and number of ships, corporate
structure, and location of corporate headquarters. For this
reason, the case study approach allows us to make meaningful
conclusions as to the effect of the fee on all firms in the
industry.
The case studies of Chapter VIII are the heart of this
research effort. Chapter VIII is a collection of summaries
of interviews with company officials and financial data for
all the firms selected for case study. In addition, esti-
mated fee costs for each firm are calculated and presented.
Estimated fee costs are presented in table format along
with other financial data. This allows the reader to de-
velop a feel for the magnitude of the fee. Chapter VII
provides a detailed description of the methodology used to
develop the case study chapter.
17

Chapter II provides a short history of the Merchant
Marine including the Coast Guard's history of interaction
with the Merchant Marine. Chapter III provides a descrip-
tion of the U.S. government's Merchant Marine subsidy pro-
gram. Chapter IV provides an overview of the U.S. Merchant
Marine engaged in international trade. These chapters pro-
vide a background in Merchant Marine affairs that is needed
to fully understand the case studies. In addition, chapter
IV provides evidence that the case studies cover a large
cross section of the industry. From this chapter the reader
is able to judge the legitimacy of drawing conclusions on
the industry as a whole based on this case study approach.
Chapter VI provides a detailed description of the pro-
posed Coast Guard user fee. As indicated earlier, these
researchers assume that should a fee be enacted it will be
very similar to the March 1932 proposal. For this reason,
Chapter VI is a cornerstone of this thesis.
Chapter V provides a description of the ocean shipping
industry. In this chapter, theories concerning the economic
conditions facing the ship operators are discussed. This
discussion concentrates on the market conditions faced by
the U.S. ship operators. This chapter provides a vital
background needed to perform an analysis of the data and
comments provided in chapter VIII.
Chapter IX provides an analysis of the data and comments
presented in chapter VIII. The analysis describes trends
13

observed in the financial data and comments of the case
study chapter. Financial data and comments of company offi-
cials are contrasted and compared. Background material de-
veloped in chapters II, III, and V are used to analyze the
data, comments, and trends. The analysis centers around
short term profitability of the firms.
From the analysis of short term profitability presented
in chapter IX, conclusions are made and described in chapter
X. The conclusions deal with the ability of the present
firms to remain in business and expected changes to the
number of ships in service as a result of the user fee.
Chapter X also makes recommendations for further study on
questions that are germane to this issue but are beyond the
scope of this study.
19

II. THE MERCHANT MARINE HISTORY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will provide the reader with the main
elements of historical background information which are
essential to the understanding of the problems faced by the
U.S. Merchant Marine today. The interplay between the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Merchant Marine is traced to provide an
understanding of what has become known as a "traditional
relationship"
.
A fundamental knowledge of the information presented in
this chapter is necessary to enable a clear understanding of
the organization to which the proposed user fees will apply,
and the traditions which may be altered.
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE
America's historical development has been heavily influ-
enced by its geography. Her umbilical cord stretched into
and across the seas from the first colonization until years
after her declaration of independence. Although she is not
entirely dependent upon foreign trade today, the United
States is by far the world's leading nation in active trading
in terms of total imports and exports
.
Merchant shipbuilding, as well as trade, flourished in
the colonial period. Rich natural resources, human talent,
20

and the ability to respond to an opportunity for profit
pushed the commercial interests of the colonies to the fore-
front of its consciousness. When the American Revolution
came, George Washington's Navy was born of the merchant and
fishing vessels of the colonies. The merchant schooner
HANNAH was commissioned on September 2, 1775 to raid British
shipping. Two days later she returned with the first prize
of the war. More ships were commissioned which led to the
capturing of many British supply ships containing weapons
and ammunition later used to drive the British out of Boston.
This refitted merchant fleet had shown that seapower was
going to play a very important role if the revolution was
going to succeed. The Continental Congress subsequently
authorized a host of fishermen and commercial sailors to
become privateers and prey on 3ritish shipping.
After the Revolution was won, America became one of the
major forces in world shipping. To raise revenue and pro-
tect the U.S. Merchant Marine as well as the manufacturing
industry which had developed during and after the Revolution,
Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury,
proposed a system of "Revenue Cutters" to enforce the pro-
visions of the Revenue Act of 1789. On August 4, 1790, ten
Revenue cutters were authorized by President Washington.
This was the birth of the U.S. Coast Guard.
Citing a desire to ensure the nation's prosperity, the
government determined that aid to the U.S. Merchant Marine
21

should take the following forms: 1) tariffs favoring goods
carried in America's ships; 2) prohibition of foreign ships
engaging in America's coastal trade; 3) and the reduction
of hazards of navigation [Ref. 1: p. 27]. The Lighthouse
Service, which later merged with the Revenue Cutter Service
to become the U.S. Coast Guard, was created to provide the
third form of aid. American shipping was in a period of
growth. At the beginning of the year 1790, only 123,893
tons of shipping were under the U.S. flag. 3y 1792, this
total had increased to 411,438 tons, and by 1800 U.S. ship-
ping had grown to 667,10 7 tons and 89% of all U.S. import
and export trade was carried in American vessels. During
the following years, the U.S. Merchant Marine growth suf-
fered from the inroads of the Barbary pirates, British and
French harassment, and the War of 1812 [Ref. 2: p. 44].
The next 35 years saw a tremendous growth in the use of
steam for propulsion. Many of these craft were experimental
and dangerous. In the year of 1832 alone, 14% of all the
world's existing steamers were destroyed by explosions. In
1838 Congress enacted a law requiring that steamships be in-
spected by trained men and that these vessels have lifeboats
and fire fighting equipment aboard. The first inspectors
were appointed by U.S. judges to form the Steamboat Inspec-
tion Service as a part of the Department of Commerce. In
1852 the Coast Guard was given the job of seeing that all
vessels complied with these laws.
22

In 1843, U.S. exports exceeded imports for the first
time in U.S. history and the launching of the first clipper
ship, RAINBOW, signaled the beginning of a new era in ship-
building. The American shipbuilding industry was very pros-
perous, selling a great many ships to foreign countries, as
well as building for domestic purchasers. Speed was at a
premium and American shipbuilders kept improving their de-
signs. In 1847, Congress passed a subsidy program to off-
set a mail subsidy program given by England to her merchant
ships. This subsidy program along with the growing Califor-
nia trade accounted for rapid increases in tonnage. It was
in this period that Congress appropriated money for life-
saving stations and equipment to be administered by the
Coast Guard.
By 1855, the North and South had begun their bickering
that would soon lead to the Civil War. This conflict,
coupled with a depression in 1861, contributed to a decline
of the Merchant Marine. Two technological advances further
contributed to the reduction of the size and importance of
the shipping industries. The first was the shift from
wooden hulled to iron vessels. The cost of U.S. steel was
higher than that of European shipbuilding countries re-
sulting in the costs of American ships being up to 75% more
than that of the foreign ships. The second was the shift
from sail to total steam propulsion. America had concen-
trated on perfecting sails for long voyages while competing
23

maritime countries worked on steam which eventually caused
the slower sailing vessels to become obsolete. To make
matters worse, the federal government turned its attention
away from shipping to developing internal communications
between the East and West coasts via rail. By 1901, the
U.S. Merchant Marine engaged in foreign trade was at one of
its lowest points in history, carrying only 9.2 percent of
its foreign commerce. After entering the war the U.S. fleet
grew to five times the size of the prewar fleet. The govern-
ment embarked on a program to transfer many of these ships
to private ownership after the war. The roots of the cur-
rent subsidy program can be traced to these years when the
government became more entangled in shipping affairs than
ever before [Ref. 3: p. 52].
The U.S. had a large, up to date Merchant Marine in the
early twenties, but very few new ships were being built. By
the middle of the thirties it was becoming obvious that the
U.S. Merchant Marine was again becoming non-competitive
against foreign vessels as the bulk of its World War I con-
structed vessels approached the end of their useful lives.
Congress enacted the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to rejuven-
ate the U.S. Maritime industry and this act remains the
backbone of the maritime assistance program of today. This
act also established the Maritime Commission which was the
forerunner of the present Maritime Administration.
24

The Second World War saw the majority of the foreign
shipping competition destroyed whereas the U.S. Merchant
Marine actually quadrupled in size. On December 31, 1946,
the U.S. Merchant fleet contained 50.6 percent of the
world's ocenagoing commercial steam and motor ship tonnage
[Ref . 4: p. 4] .
During the period just after the war, the U.S. Merchant
Marine carried a large part of the world's commerce and a
much larger share of U.S. trade than it had since the earli-
est years of the republic. This heyday was not to last.
The U.S. Merchant Marine steadily declined in size until the
early 1970s. In 1970, it was down to the seventh largest in
the world. The Merchant Marine Act of 1970, an amendment to
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, created large increases in
government assistance and expanded the eligibility of re-
cipients of the aid. For some time the industry started an
upturn and an air of optimism prevailed, but the aid did not
provide any real improvement in the competitive position.
Table I depicts the major merchant fleets of the world as
of 1 January 1980 and ranks them both by number of ships and
by total dead weight tonnage.
The present American Merchant Marine handles less than
four percent of the U.S. foreign trade. No other maritime
nation carries so little of its own commerce. Table II
demonstrates the percentage of U.S. oceanborne foreign cargo
























Ships Rank # Dead Wt Tons Size
2,380 3 158,702,000 1
2,876 1 63,542,000 2
1,751 5 61,192,000 3
1,110 6 41,937,000 4
632 9 39,494,000 5
2,347 4 35,257,000 6
2,512 2 21,590,000 7
569 11 20,540,000 8
359 17 19,384,000 9
624 10 18,489,000 10
506 12 12,656,000 11
502 13 12,435,000 12
667 7 12,341,000 13
645 3 9,372,000 14
363 16 9,100,000 15
6,955 114,321,000
24,798
(Source: MARAD Annual Report 19 30)
650,902,000
is beginning to gain a high priority with hopes of a solution
which will increase the U.S. Flag tonnage carried and at the




U.S. Oceanborne Foreign Trade Tonnage (in millions)
Calendar Year 1973 1975 1977 1979
Liner Total Tons 51.3 44.3 47.3 57.0
Liner U.S. Flag Tons 13.2 13.6 14.4 15.7
Liner U.S. Percent 25.8 30.7 30.2 27.5
Non-Liner Total Tons 281.9 275.3 289.0 342.7
Non-Liner U.S. Flag Tons 4.5 3.8 5.7 3.6
Non-Liner U.S. Percent 1.6 1.4 2.0 1.0
Total Tons 631.6 615.6 775.3 823.1
U.S. Flag Tons 39.9 31.4 34.8 35.0
U.S. Percent of Total 6.3 5.1 4.5 4.2
(Source: MARAD Annual Report 19 80)
C . SUMMARY
This chapter has presented a short history reflecting
the development of the U.S. Merchant Marine. It has brought
forth the many problems faced by the industry and shown that
the U.S. Coast Guard has evolved into one of the Merchant
Marine's government funded supports. In the next chapter, a
summary of the entire federal aid program to the Merchant
Marine will be presented to provide the reader with a com-
plete understanding of the industry's financial troubles.
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III. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE U.S. MARITIME INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the reasoning behind the U.S.
Government's perception of need for a Merchant Marine and
also its broad expectations. The preceding chapter has dis-
cussed the many problems faced by the Merchant Marine. This
chapter will present the government's conceived solutions to
those problems.
B. THE REASON
In order to attain and maintain certain economic objec-
tives and to ensure supply line support in event the nation's
security is challenged, the federal government has adopted
as national policy that the United States must have a domes-
tic vessel building industry to furnish boats and ships for
our maritime industries, and have its own Merchant Marine
capable of carrying a significant percentage of the nation's
foreign commerce, and all of its interstate waterborne
commerce
.
The U.S. maritime industry and particularly shipbuilding
and shipping have for a long time been considered an essen-
tial part of U.S. defense and economic strategies. The re-
quirement to provide shipping for national defense can be
divided into two components. The first is to provide the
23

necessary shipping capability to move military cargo and the
second is to provide the shipping that is necessary to move
imports needed for the support of essential elements of the
national economy in a time of national emergency. As de-
fined in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the economic ob-
jective of providing shipping for the development of commerce
is defined in terms of economic benefits and includes:
1. The promotion of U.S. foreign trade.
2. The creation of employment for U.S. citizens.
3. A favorable contribution to the U.S. balance of
payments
.
4. The assurance of fair and reasonable freight rates for
U.S. imports and exports.
The traditional argument for government assistance has
been the need to equalize the costs to permit the U.S. Mari-
time industry to compete effectively with the foreign flag
industry which has presumably lower costs. The U.S. Congress
enacted the Merchant Marine Act of 19 36 to assure that the
aforementioned objectives were met.
Title I of the Act summarizes the policy:
It is necessary for the national defense and development
of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States
shall have a Merchant Marine (a) sufficient to carry its
domestic water-borne commerce and a substantial portion of
the waterborne export and import foreign commerce of the
United States and to provide shipping service essential
for maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign
water-borne commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving
as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or na-
tional emergency, (c) owned and operated under the United
States flag by citizens of the United States insofar as
may be practical, (d) composed of the best equipped,
safest, and most suitable types of vessels, constructed in
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the United States and manned with a trained and efficient
citizen personnel and (e) supplemented by efficient fa-
cilities for shipbuilding and ship repair. [Ref. 5: p. 12]
This act and its many later amendments foster the U.S.
Merchant Marine in a variety of different areas. The govern-
ment has the choice of a broad selection of assistance tools
to use in providing aid to the maritime industries if and
whenever it deems necessary. Jantscher [Ref. 6: p. 10]
categorizes this aid as either fiscal or non-fiscal. Fiscal
aid refers to any form of assistance that is given through
monetary transfers between the government and industry.
Non-fiscal aid refers to assistance given through the govern-
ment's ability to legislate regulation. The U.S. program
for maritime assistance includes both.
C. FISCAL AID PROGRAMS
Fiscal aid programs are administered through the use of
the government's spending and taxation powers. These pro-
grams take many forms but basically provide aid through
loans, subsidies, tax relief, or discriminatory taxes levied
upon foreign shipping on the goods which they bring in.
1. The Operating Differential Subsidy (OPS)
The First U.S. ODS came with the Merchant Marine Act
of 1923, which provided public subsidies to private shipping
lines through the award of lucrative mail contracts. This
program failed primarily because contracts were awarded
without regard to the needs of the U.S. shippers or the
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Postal Service. There were cries of scandal when U.S. Ship-
ping Board members were identified closely with the opera-
tors receiving the extravagant awards. This experience
inspired the careful study and investigation that preceded
enactment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
In general, the present ODS program seeks to equalize
the disparity in operating costs between those of American
ships and their foreign competitors with respect to the of-
ficers' and crews' wages, insurance, maintenance, and re-
pairs not compensated by insurance. The law requires that
in order to be eligible for ODS the carrier must perform a
service that the U.S. Maritime Administration determines to
be "essential" in U.S. foreign commerce, and they must use
American built vessels that are registered under the U.S.
flag and crewed by U.S. citizens. The act provides that
each contractor be paid an amount not to exceed the excess
of the fair and reasonable cost of these items over the esti-
mated costs of the same items if the contractor's vessels
were operated under the flag of a credible foreign competi-
tor. Most problems associated with this program derive from
the lack of guidance in determining which costs are fair and
reasonable, and how the competitor's costs are to be estab-
lished. The Maritime Administration determines the operating
costs of each contractor's main foreign competitors as best
it can, attempting to compare each particular expense item.
The difference between each competitor's cost and the
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contractor's cost is computed. A weighted average is then
computed reflecting the importance of each competitor. The
final weighted difference is expressed as a fraction of the
contractor's own expense which determines the subsidy rate
for each item. The amount of subsidy that is due the opera-
tor is then calculated as the product of the rate and the
operator's expenses. This calculation is repeated for each
subsidizable item.
The amounts of money spent in the past for operating
differential subsidies are a matter of public record ob-
tainable through the Maritime Administration. Published
figures show that expenditure from 1955 to 1980 have well
exceeded $5.5 billion in ODS alone (see Table III). Cur-
rently ODS is costing in the neighborhood of $350,000,000
per year. The total cost of the program, since its incep-
tion in 1936, is approximately 13.8 billion dollars when
converted to 1980 dollar values using the GNP deflator.
2 . The Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS)
As with the operating differential subsidy, "differ-
ential" is the key word in defining the purpose of this
financial aid program to shipowners for the purchase of new
vessels. CDS can be defined as the difference in cost be-
tween the estimated cost to construct a ship in a foreign
shipyard and the cost of the same ship constructed in a U.S.
shipyard. This subsidy program is considered necessary to
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(Source: MARAD Annual Report 19 80)
of the U.S. shipbuilding industry. Presumably it ensures a
degree of national self-sufficiency in supporting capital
acquisitions of the U.S. maritime industries. CDS may also
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be paid to aid in the reconstruction and reconditioning of
existing ships if it is determined that the project consti-
tutes an exceptional case. All applications are received by
the Maritime Administration where they are analyzed and a
recommendation is then submitted to the Maritime Subsidy
Board for consideration and action. The Merchant Marine Act
of 1936 defines the requirements that a prospective CDS
applicant must meet under its Title V section. The follow-
ing is an abbreviated group of eligibility requirements for
CDS:
1. The prospective purchaser must be a citizen of the
United States.
2. The ship must be built for use in the foreign commerce
of the United States.
3. The shipyard which will construct the ship must be lo-
cated in one of the 50 states or Puerto Rico.
4. The prospective purchaser must possess the financial
and other qualifications necessary for the acquisi-




The ship to be constructed must meet the requirements
of the foreign commerce of the United States, be capa-
ble of aiding in the promotion and development of such
commerce, and be suitable for use by the United States
for national defense or military purposes in times of
national emergency.
6. The owner must agree to the following restrictions
placed on ships built with the aid of CDS:
a) A ship must be documented under the laws of the
U.S. for 25 years (20 years for liquid bulk
carriers)
.




c) The ship must be operated in either the U.S. to
foreign commerce or foreign to foreign commerce,
or else a portion of the CDS will be required to
be refunded.
d) If the U.S. purchases or requisitions the vessel,
the owner shall be paid the depreciated original
construction costs or the scrap value, whichever
is greater.
The Maritime Administration gives preferential con-
sideration to those applications that tend to minimize the
CDS and to those that will result in the construction of
ships having higher transport capability and productivity.
Any required or recommended national defense features incor-
porated into the construction of a proposed CDS commercial
ship solely to enhance its value to the U.S. government,
will be completely paid for by the United States government.
All designs to be considered for CDS therefore must be sub-
mitted first to the Department of the Navy for review and
approval as to adaptability for military auxiliary use prior
to any CDS funds being granted.
The allowable percentage of total costs for the CDS
program has fluctuated in the past from 33 1/3% to 55% until
1976, when a maximum was set at 50% of the total construc-
tion costs. The Maritime Administration however, has tar-
geted expected subsidy goals for each year since 1976 to be
slightly but increasingly less than the 50% ceiling and has
been very successful in achieving these productivity goals.
Although this program is very expensive, it has achieved a
fair amount of success. According to Kiss (1977) [Ref. 4:
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p. 11], each dollar of the CDS program has, in the past,
exerted considerable leverage in generating from three to
over six dollars of ship construction. In other words, $1
million in CDS could result in ship construction contracts
worth from $3 to $6 million for U.S. shipyards. Table IV
demonstrates the total in CDS outlays since its inception in
1936 until 1980. The total cost of the program, since its
inception in 1936, is approximately 6.58 billion dollars
when converted to 1980 dollar value using the GNP deflator.
3 . Tax Subsidies
In contrast with the outright expenditures of the
direct maritime subsidies described previously, the tax sub-
sidies are given in the form of interest-free loans. In
this program, the U.S. government foregoes collection of
taxes on a part or all of the shipowners' earnings and grants
the owners the use of this money provided they invest it in
replacement equipment and vessels. These deferred taxes
will have to be converted into capital equipment eventually,
but no interest will be charged.
The 1970 amendments to the Merchant Marine Act of
1936 authorized United States shipowners to establish "capi-
tal construction funds" (CCF) for the purpose of accumulating
the large quantities of capital necessary for the moderniza-
tion and expansion of the U.S. maritime industry. Such funds
may be created by any U.S. citizen who owns or leases vessels































































































(Source: MARAD Annual Report 1980)
U.S. commerce or the fisheries of the United States. Accord-
ing to Jantscher (1973) [Ref. 6: p. 56], all the earnings
of such vessels may be deposited in the fund. There are
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scarcely any restrictions on who may create these funds and
what vessel's earnings may be deposited in them. The only
ocean trade to which restrictions are applied as far as
using the CCF is the coastwise trade. Although owners of
coastwise trade ships can deposit their receipts in CCF ' s
,
they cannot use those moneys to build new vessels for opera-
tion in that trade. However, they are able to use the funds
to build vessels for operation of non-contiguous state or
foreign trade.
The statute directs that three accounts should be
maintained in each CCF: a capital account, a capital gains
account, and an ordinary income account. These accounts are
simply a means of segregating tax paid deposits, tax de-
ferred deposits of capital gains, and tax deferred deposits
of ordinary income. Deposits that are representative of
amounts which would not be taxed, such as depreciation, are
credited to the capital account. If the deposit is repre-
sentative of an amount which would otherwise be taxed at an
ordinary income rate , it is credited to the ordinary income
account. The most important distinction is between tax paid
and tax deferred deposits, since it is only through the lat-
ter that a subsidy is given. The taxes are eventually re-
covered on tax deferred deposits by a reduction in the
depreciable base of new vessels bought with this money, but
the payment of tax can still be put off by reinvesting the
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new vessel's earnings in the owner's capital construction
fund.
To measure the costs of the maritime tax subsidies
raises peculiar problems, stemming from the form in which
they are given. Because these subsidies are given in the
form of tax deferral rather than tax exemption, the cost
depends on the length of time the taxes are deferred and
what discount rate is used to calculate present values. In
the wake of double digit inflation rates of the past several
years, it is quite obvious that this fiscal aid program is
of considerable benefit to the maritime industries at a
substantial cost to the government.
The maritime industries are also eligible for in-
vestment tax credits like all U.S. taxpayers, however,
credits are disallowed if the investment is purchased with
tax deferred funds. This ruling has been challenged by the
maritime industry but has not been ruled upon to date.
4 . Discriminatory Duty Taxes
This form of fiscal instrument may be used to aid a
nation's maritime industry by being levied upon foreign
vessels or the cargo carried in their holds. When these
taxes are imposed at prohibitive rates, however, they essen-
tially eliminate the foreign competition in the same way as
non-fiscal legislated prohibition. The United States
Congress years ago enacted a discriminatory duty tax on
imported goods carried in foreign flag vessels, but gave the
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President authority to refrain from using it against vessels
registered in countries that do not discriminate against U.S.
flag vessels. This duty has never been imposed. The only
form of discriminatory duty tax currently used by the U.S.
is levied on the repairs made on U.S. flag vessels in
foreign countries, and on the equipment and materials pro-
cured abroad for such repairs. This duty is levied at a
straight 50% rate and can be avoided only by producing evi-
dence that the work was necessary to secure the immediate
safety of the vessel.
5 . Federal Ship Financing Program
Established pursuant to Title XI of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, this program provides for a full credit
guarantee by the U.S. Government of debt obligations issued
by U.S. citizen shipowners for the purpose of financing or
refinancing U.S. flag vessels constructed or reconstructed
in U.S. shipyards. The program provides a guarantee of up
to 75% of the actual cost of vessels over 5 net tons. The
value of this program to the maritime industry is essentially
the same as the value of FHA loan guarantees to eligible
prospective home buyers. Table V presents a program summary
with total liabilities as of September 30, 1980.
D. NON-FISCAL AID PROGRAMS
Non-fiscal maritime aid programs are enacted through
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'Source: MARAD Annual Reoort 19 80
delegated federal agencies. As with the fiscal programs,
the non-fiscal aids cover a fairly wide spectrum and provide
support in a variety of ways. The most important of these
programs take the form of cabotage laws, cargo preference
laws, international bilateral agreements, restriction of
national registry to locally built vessels, and finally the
services provided by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Army Corps
of Engineers.
1 . Cabotage Laws
For hundreds of years the sovereign right of all
nations to reserve its coastal trade to its own vessels, if
it so chooses, has been recognized internationally. Cobotage
laws are among the oldest forms of assistance to a nation's
maritime industries. The cabotage laws of the United States
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since 1807 have required that the U.S. coastwise trade be
reserved for vessels documented and built in the United
States. Foreign built vessels may be documented under the
U.S. flag, but can engage only in U.S. to foreign trade.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, or Jones Act as it has be-
come known, is the legislation which has become a synonym for
all U.S. cabotage laws. This act reestablished the coastal
monopoly after World War I. It was felt that the U.S.
should open coastal trade to foreign vessels as its own
ships were needed to support the war effort. A section of
this act also extended the coastwise laws to the nation's
territories and possessions. Foreign fishing vessels were
forbidden to land their catches in U.S. ports by the Amend-
ment of September 2, 1950, and in 1970, foreign dredges,
tugs, and salvage vessels were disallowed from operations
in U.S. waters.
It is very difficult to evaluate the costs vs. bene-
fits of the cabotage laws, however it is easy to see that
the costs are incurred entirely by the shippers and the
buyers of the goods shipped, while the U.S. coastwise mari-
time industry competes only within its own ranks.
2 . Cargo Preference Laws
Preference cargo can be generally defined to be that
cargo in which the federal government has a direct property
interest, or cargo being transported as a result of a trans-
action in which the government played a role. Preference
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cargos are only a small percentage of this country's foreign
trade, but are a lion's share of the cargo shipped in U.S.
registered vessels. There are a number of cargo preference
laws, some of which are inclusions of acts establishing
foreign assistance programs. Three of these are of major
importance to the maritime industry:
1. The Military Transportation Act of 1904 directs
that all supplies for the U.S. services that move by sea
must be carried in vessels owned by the U.S. government or
commercial vessels registered in the U.S.
2. The Cargo Preference Act of 1954 amended the Mer-
chant Marine Act of 1936 to enact cargo preference expansion
to three more classes of goods: a) goods bought by the
government for its own use, b) goods provided by the govern-
ment for the use of a foreign nation, and c) all goods for
which the government funds, grants credits, or has guaranteed
the convertibility of foreign currencies. This statute re-
quired that whenever such goods are transported by ship, at
least 50% of the cargo, by gross tonnage, must be carried in
privately owned U.S. flag vessels, provided such vessels are
available
.
3. The third program of major importance was enacted
by Congress as Public Resolution 17 and declared that when-
ever loans were made by any U.S. government agency to foster
the export of U.S. products, those products should be car-




Restriction of National Registry to Locally Built
Vessels
This form of aid is not followed in the U.S. except
in its coastal trade. Vessels constructed in foreign coun-
tries may be registered in the U.S. for purposes of engaging
in foreign trade. However, they are not eligible for the
O.D.S. program.
4 Bilateral Agreements
These are agreements between two nations concerning
the percentage of the total cargo trade to be carried in
each country's vessels. The U.S. has entered into agreements
of such with a few countries, but- to a much lesser extent
than most maritime nations. The U.S. has a bilateral agree-
ment with the USSR in which each country is guaranteed 1/3
of the total trade tonnage in their own ships and reserves
the remaining 1/3 to be transported by third nation vessels.
There have been times when the U.S. has not had enough ships
available to carry its full negotiated percentage.
5. U.S.C.G. and Corps of Engineers Services
Both of these organizations have traditionally pro-
vided services to the maritime industry in the form of search
and rescue, icebreaking, safety inspections and administra-
tion, navigation aid (long range and short) , harbor dredging
and channel clearance, and many others. These services have
always been financed by the government as an aid to all users
of navigable waters. 3oth organizations have been directed
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by the present administration to propose a user fee system
which will be designed to extract the program costs from the
users. When these user fee systems have been approved and
enacted, these services will no longer be considered in the
category of U.S. government aid.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter has presented the government's program to
counter the problems faced by the American Merchant Marine
in general. The costs are difficult to measure in some of
the individual programs, but it can be seen from the ac-
cruals shown on Tables III and IV that the government has
granted appreciable subsidies to the Merchant Marine from
1936 to the present. The next chapter will present a close
examination of who and what makes up the segment of the
Merchant Marine engaged in foreign trade.
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IV. THE SHIPS AND FIRMS OF THE OCEANGOING
U.S. MERCHANT MARINE
A. INTRODUCTION
Up to this point in the thesis, the reader has frequently
encountered the term "ocean-going U.S. Merchant Marine".
The oceangoing U.S. Merchant Marine has been defined as
those firms that own and operate U.S. flag vessels engaged
in foreign trade. It is now necessary to introduce to the
reader the individual firms that make up the industry. This
chapter also provides a brief description of the ships that
the firms use. The industry is a capital intensive industry
and is difficult to enter. The number of ships engaged in
the trade is limited. The number of firms engaged in the
trade is even smaller. For this reason, one is quickly able
to gain a working knowledge of "Who's Who" in the industry.
This chapter starts out with a description of the number
and types of ships engaged in the trade. Following a de-
scription of the ships is a discussion of the firms that
operate the ships.
B. FLEET PROFILE
According to the 1980 Annual Report of the Maritime Ad-
ministration, at the end of fiscal year 1980, there were 722
privately owned U.S. flag vessels including 145 ships in the
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Great Lakes fleet. These vessels had a record cargo-
carrying capacity of 24 million deadweight tons. Of the 577
oceangoing vessels, 45 were in an inactive status leaving
only 532 active oceangoing vessels. A little over half of
the inactive vessels were laid up and the remainder were
temporarily inactive, either awaiting cargos or undergoing
repairs. The segment of the fleet actively engaged in for-
eign trade included 227 vessels of 6.6 million deadweight
tons (dwt) . Individual ships in the fleet average 36,435
tons, are generally 17 years old, and make an average speed
of 17 knots. The employment and general composition of the
fleet is shown in Table VI.
TABLE VI
Employment of U.S. -Flag Oceangoing Fleet September 30, 1980





Other U.S. Agency Operations
Inactive Vessels
Total
***Component of active U.S. Private Oceangoing Fleet.
(Source: MARAD Annual Report 19 80)
Within each vessel category there are scores of different










the scope of this paper. The type of ship is based on the
method in which cargo is stored. Within the freighter cate-
gory, there are two basic types that bear mentioning. The
two types are breakbulk ships and containerships . The
breakbulk ship in laymen's terms is a typical freighter.
Cargo is brought aboard the ship and stowed in the hold.
Considerable effort and expense is required to properly stow
the cargo. In most situations, it takes a week to ten days
to unload and load a ship. When carrying cargo to modern
ports, the breakbulk freighter is not an efficient way to
carry cargo. The container vessels are much more efficient
as described below. The breakbul-k vessel is effective how-
ever, when carrying cargo to ports where large modern facili-
ties are not available. In this case, the ship's cargo
handling gear can be used to load and off load the ship.
For this reason, the breakbulk ship is often attractive from
a military perspective.
Within the container type there are three major subdivi-
sions. The subdivisions are the Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH)
,
the Roll-On-Roll-Off (RO/RO) , and the Lift-On-Lift-Of
f
(LO/LO) vessels. For the containerships, cargo is packed
into freight containers that are brought aboard the ship.
In the case of the LASH ships, the containers are barges
that are actually lifted aboard the ship. For RO/RO ships,
cargo is in anything that can be rolled or driven aboard,
but most often found in the form of structurally reinforced
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truck type trailers. The trailers are actually hauled
aboard the ship by a truck. LO/LO ships store truck type
trailers en board with the wheels removed. A large special
crane is needed to lift the trailers aboard the ship.
Trailers are stowed in the holds of the ships and on the
decks.
The principal advantage of containerships is the speed
in which cargo can be moved and, with certain types of con-
tainers, the ability to convert the containers into overland
transportation vehicles. A LO/LO ship alongside a modern
facility designed to accommodate it can be off-loaded, re-
loaded and underway in less than 48 hours. RO/RO and LASH
vessels enjoy a similar advantage over conventional break-
bulk vessels. Except for the LASH vessel however, RO/RO and
LO/LO vessels are at somewhat of a disadvantage in that they
need specialized shore side equipment to load and off load.
For military purposes, this creates a problem. A military
operation is not guaranteed to be conducted at a modern port
facility. Since national security and the needs of the mili-
tary are frequently cited as a reason for subsidizing the
Merchant Marine, this aspect of ship configuration must be
considered. LASH vessels need no special equipment to con-
duct loading operations. The vessels carry a large crane
that is designed to pick up the barges carried aboard the
ship. As long as tugs are available, LASH vessels can off














Combo Pax/Cargo 5 45 5 39 10 84
Freighters 103 1,406 10 83 113 1,489
Bulk Carriers 15 484 15 484
Tankers 249 13,147 2 21 251 13,168
Intermodal 142 2,929 2 39 144 2,969
Tug/Barge 9 260 9 260
LNG 9 646 9 646
Inactive Fleet 45 2,106 267 2,774 312 4,380
TOTAL U.S. FLAG 577 21,023 286 2,956 863 23,979
(Source: MARAD Annual Report 19 80)
There are approximately 20 firms that operate U.S. flag
vessels engaged in foreign trade. Eighteen of these firms
receive operating-differential subsidies from the Maritime
Administration. Table VIII is a listing of the firms and
the trades they are engaged in. Most of the firms have been
in business for over fifty years although some of the current
names are less than 20 years old. Firms operate either sub-
sidized or unsubsidized vessels.
The number of firms engaged in the trade has steadily de-
clined since the end of World War II. The decline is due to
many factors and not necessarily the result of lack of busi-




Firms Operating U.S. Flag Vessels
Name of Firm
American President Lines Ltd.
Delta Steamship Lines Inc.
Farrell Lines Inc.




Aeron Marine Shipping Co.*
American Shipping Co.*
Aquarius Marine Co.*
Aries Marine Shipping Co.*






Worth Oil Transport Co.
Sea-Land Services
United States Lines Inc.
*Berger Group Subsidiary
**Keystone Shipping Subsidiary
(Source: MARAD Annual Report 19 80)
business are now serviced by one of the firms that was able
to survive in the trade. The one exception to this is the
passenger trade. The advent of overseas airline service
marked the end of passenger liner service. Most of the























operators of U.S. flag vessels also are the owners of the
vessels. Many of the steamship companies are subsidiaries
of other U.S. corporations.
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V. THE OCEAN SHIPPING MARKETPLACE
A. INTRODUCTION
An analysis of the effects of the proposed Coast Guard
user fee must consider the possibility of firms in the in-
dustry passing the fee on to customers. In order to consider
this question it is necessary to examine the market structure
of the industry. The first three sections of this chapter
describe the world-wide ocean shipping marketplace. This
discussion provides the necessary background to consider
those sectors of the industry serviced by the U.S. Merchant
Marine. Since U.S. flag vessels receive numerous subsidies
from the U.S. government, the U.S. Merchant Marine faces
certain market conditions not common to world wide shipping.
The discussion of the industry structure begins with a de-
scription of the various types of ocean shipping service.
B. OCEAN SHIPPING SERVICE
There are basically three types of ocean shipping ser-
vice available. These are: 1) liner service; 2) charter
service; and 3) industrial service.
Liner operators are common carriers that operate along
specific trade routes at regular intervals. Charter ser-
vice or "tramp" service provides shipping "anywhere cargo
needs to go." Shippers utilizing charter service usually
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have an entire shipload of cargo to move. Industrial ser-
vice refers to a situation where a company engaged in another
industry also operates its own ships. The most common exam-
ple of this is oil companies that own and operate a fleet of
tankers. Each type of service is designed to meet specific
needs and faces different market conditions.
Sections C and D of this chapter describe the market
conditions for charter and liner service. Further discus-
sion of industrial service is not provided. The explanation
of this type of service provided in the preceding paragraph
is a sufficient discussion of this form of ocean shipping.
C. CHARTER SERVICE
Shippers utilize charter service for the following
reasons:
1. For cargos greater than 5000 tons it is often diffi-
cult to secure space on a liner.
2. Liner service is associated with higher shipping rates.
3. Liners don't necessarily service desired ports.
4. The charter vessel can provide direct service.
5. Liner operators occasionally charter to meet peak
demands
.
6. Charter service relieves the shipper of the need to
invest in ships.
7. Nature of the cargo. Coal, bulk cement, iron ore,
bauxite, and all petroleum products moving in ship
load lots are typical of the commodities not suscepti-
ble to liner-type movement. [Ref. 3: p. 77]
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The market place for charter service demonstrates all of
the characteristics of a perfectly competitive industry.
Because of the international nature of ocean shipping, regu-
lation is at a minimum. Rates for charter service fluctuate
from hour to hour. Because the supply of ships is not
easily changed in response to world shipping needs, charter
rates can soar or plunge wildly in response to demand.
There are three types of contracts governing ships
operated under charter. Each contract imposes different
obligations upon the contracting parties. The three basic






In voyage and time charter, the owner continues to main-
tain, crew, and operate the vessel. Service is provided to
the charterer of a voyage on time basis as the name implies.
For bareboat chartering, the charterer actually takes con-
trol of the vessel similar to the way an individual rents an
automobile. The charterer provides the crew, operates the
vessel, and provides limited maintenance in accordance with
the charter agreement.
D. LINER SERVICE
The introduction of the steam engine into ocean shipping
in the mid-nineteenth century allowed ships to provide fast
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regular service along certain trade routes . This new tech-
nology was the basis for liner service as it is known today.
Liner service quickly became very popular with many ship-
pers. Although liners commanded top freight rates, they
provided many advantages that more than offset the addi-
tional costs.
Most noteworthy of the advantages provided by liner ser-
vice is it allowed firms to keep smaller inventories.
Smaller inventories backed up by fast regular transporta-
tion provided many cost savings. These inventory cost
savings are one reason why liner service remains popular
today.
Ship owners have long known that most of the costs asso-
ciated with operating a ship are fixed costs. This situa-
tion requires the ship owner to allocate costs in setting
his shipping rates. The introduction of the steamship ac-
centuated this problem as fuel costs increased the already
high level of fixed costs. It costs almost the same for a
ship to sail between two ports whether it is empty or full.
This same situation exists today. As can be observed in
Table IX, average shipping cost per unit of output (AC)
falls sharply as output increases from zero until at an
output of OQ units AC rises vertically. At this point the
capacity of the vessel has been reached and further shipping
service can only be achieved at the cost of providing
another ship. OP is the lowest price per unit that can be
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charged for an assumed homogeneous cargo that will allow the
operator to recover costs. At any price below OP the vessel
cannot be continued in operation beyond a short term regard-
less of the proportion of capacity utilized. [Ref. 7: p.
88]
TABLE IX





The only variable costs associated with shipping are
those related to cargo handling. An empty ship will have no
cargo handling costs whereas a full ship will have substan-
tial cargo handling costs. In addition some cargos are more
fragile than others and therefore require different handling
that varies in cost. Only 10-15% of ship operating costs
are associated with cargo handling.
Since most costs are fixed costs, the ship owner is
faced with the problem in allocating these costs when setting
his shipping rates. This problem became a bigger concern
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with the introduction of the liner as fuel and regular-
schedules added to fixed costs. Steamship companies quickly-
found that the only practical way to allocate costs was to
base freight rates primarily on cargo value. The more
valuable the cargo, the higher the shipping charge it would
bear
.
The advances in marine technology that produced steam-
ships, and introduced liner service also made larger ships
possible. Demand for liner service produced more ships. It
was soon learned that demand for liner service was cyclical.
By the 1870 's a decline in the demand for shipping resulted
in more ships than cargo. As a result of this excess capa-
city, rates for liner service declined dramatically. Excess
capacity, high fixed costs, and the international nature of
the industry provided an ideal climate for this situation.
It soon became apparent that all but the very strong would
be forced to leave the industry. Because of the large
amounts of capital required to enter the industry, it was
also evident that the industry would not recover.
In an attempt to avoid losses, ship owners organized
into cartels called conferences. The first conference was
established on the Great Britain-Calcutta trade route in
1875. Other conferences developed as the result of the
success of the first conference. Today there are some 360
conferences throughout the world with over 100 serving the
U.S. trades. [Ref. 8: p. 112]
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Conferences set shipping rates and control entrance into
the liner trades. Shippers utilizing conference vessels
enter into tying arrangements with the conference and re-
ceive discounts for shipping with conference vessels. Firms
violating tying arrangements are penalized. The penalty in
the U.S. for violation of the tying arrangement is payment
to the conference the shipping rate less actual cost of
handling the consignment. Conference members who undercut
freight rates are also penalized.
Because of the problems with allocating the high fixed
costs associated with liner operations, conferences practice
price differentiation. Under this practice freight rates
are set to a large extent based on the value of the cargos
being carried. Rates also vary depending on whether the
ship is headed "outward" or "homeward" . Freight rates are
developed for thousands of commodities.
Microeconomic principles indicate that the cartel leads
to some degree of exercise of market power. For shipping
conferences, however, many characteristics of a monopoly are
present but strong forces exist that limit their monopolistic
powers. To understand the limitations on conference power
it is necessary to reexamine the problem of allocating fixed
costs and the nature of the cargo being handled.
As noted earlier in this section, freight rates are
largely dependent on the value of the commodity being
shipped. High value items easily accept high freight rates.
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Rates might be ten times higher than the freight rate if
fixed costs were allocated on the basis of cubic cargo, the
standard measure used in shipping. Low value items on the
other hand cannot bear the fixed costs of shipping if allo-
cated based on cubic cargo. In the middle, there is a broad
band of commodities where the freight rates capable of being
absorbed are closer to fixed costs allocated based on cubic
cargo. Unfortunately for the ship operator, there is not
enough high and medium value cargo to consistently fill the
ship. As a result, liner operators must carry a wide spec-
trum of cargo. The only way to do this is through price
differentiation. [Ref. 3: p. 63]
For high value cargo, liners face competition from the
air freight operators. At the lower end of the scale, cargo
consignments in ship load lots are easier to come by. For
this reason competition from charter service becomes a sig-
nificant factor. Table X is a demand curve for liner ser-
vice. The elasticity of various cargo to freight rates is
demonstrated. As can be observed, shippers of medium value
cargo have less flexibility in shipping. Their demand for
ocean shipping is less elastic.
As was demonstrated, conferences are limited in their
monopoly power by air transportation and charter service.
Other factors that control conference members are the
remaining members, shippers and governments. In order to
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conference prices, freight rates have to approximate those
that would develop if there was perfect competition. Ship-
pers also are able to limit the conference monopoly power.
As indicated, shippers of low value cargo often can turn to
charter service if liner prices are not controlled. In
addition, shippers moving that broad band of cargo best
suited for the liner, have been known to form cooperatives
to provide ocean transportation service in response to high
conference prices [Ref. 7: p. 107]. Although this prac-
tice has been attempted in the past, cooperatives have
rarely been organized in recent times. Finally, most
governments of the world monitor the practices of liner
conferences. Although regulation is minimal, few govern-
ments will allow conferences to damage overseas trade. In
the United States, the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) is
the organization of the federal government that monitors
ocean shipping. The role of the FMC is to assure that the
cartel-like practices of a conference do not violate the
exemptions from U.S. anti-trust laws granted to ocean ship-
ping firms. Liner operators therefore do not exercise mono-
poly power. Conferences do however help operators cover
costs and make a profit.
Despite the problems associated with cartels, shipping
conferences have managed to survive for over 100 years.
Conferences have been generally accepted by ship owners,
shippers, and governments. They are viewed as the least of
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many other evils. Even the United States, with its penchant
for free trade, recognizes the need for shipping confer-
ences. Shipping laws allow within definite limits, exemp-
tions from anti-trust laws for any conferences in U.S.
foreign trade. Membership in conferences, by law, must be
open to all carriers in the trade covered by the conference.
E. THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE
The U.S. Merchant Marine, except for short periods fol-
lowing World I and II, has had trouble competing in the
ocean shipping market since the days of the clipper ships.
The principal reasons for this are higher crew costs, higher
costs of U.S. built ships, higher costs associated with
operating older ships and higher costs associated with main-
taining corporate headquarters in the U.S. Although the U.S.
Merchant Marine has higher costs, it offers only marginally
greater productivity.
The years after World War II are considered the golden
years of the U.S. Merchant Marine. The U.S. fleet enjoyed a
competitive advantage in that most other Merchant Marines
were at the bottom of the ocean as a result of the war.
Ever since World War II, the U.S. Merchant Marine has steadi-
ly declined as other countries have rebuilt their fleets. At
present, the U.S. flag fleet carries less than 4% of the
nation's cargo. As of 1982, the greater part of the U.S.
Merchant Marine engaged in foreign trade is able to survive
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because of operating-differential subsidies received from
the federal government. Outside of the subsidized fleet,
there are only a few firms that are able to compete on an
unsubsidized basis. These firms are competitive in that
they pioneered liner service in container trade on those
routes where large amounts of high value cargo are carried.
The combination of flexibility of operation and aggressive
pursuit of cargo freighted at high rates gives them the
ability to compete successfully with the foreign-flag opera-
tors on their routes.
1 . U.S. Liner Trades
As can be seen in Table XI, the U.S. Merchant Marine
is a small factor in the ocean shipping market affecting
imports and exports to the U.S. Due to U.S. law, however,
the industry is able to bring significant forces to bear on
its markets out of proportion to its size.
TABLE XI
United States Merchant Marine Position in World Shipping
Number of Privately Owned Ships 56 9
Rank by Number of Ships 11
Total Deadweight Tons 20,540,000
Rank by Deadweight Tonnage 3
Total Tons of U.S. Oceanborne Cargo 323,100,000 (1979]
Total U.S. Cargo Carried by U.S. Flag 35,000,000
U.S. Flag Percent of Total 4.2
(Source: Maritime Administration Annual Report 1980)
64

As explained in chapter III, U.S. law requires that
certain cargos be carried aboard U.S. vessels. For U.S.
lines this often provides the firm considerable influence in
setting rates along the firm's trade routes. Conferences
have found it impractical to discriminate among shippers
moving the same commodity. The conferences therefore have a
single rate for each commodity. If U.S. carriers are dis-
satisfied with the conference rate they can leave the con-
ference and still retain the preference cargos. Capacity
not needed for preference cargos can be used to compete
against the conference. Because of this threat, foreign
carriers have the tendency to go along with rates sought by
U.S. carriers unless the rates are excessively high and
threaten to strangle private trade.
Another factor that gives the American liner carrier
l
of preference cargo the power to influence the conference is
the elasticity of demand for preference cargos. Preference
cargos result from federal government programs such as Food
for Peace. According to Jantscher [Ref. 6: p. 63], an or-
ganization purchasing an item under such arrangements is
less concerned about the price of the item than under normal
market conditions. Since the U.S. government is financing
the purchase, the purchaser has less incentive to seek the
best price available. This attitude carries over into ship-
ping. The shipper of preference cargo is therefore less
concerned about shipping costs. This factor makes it easier
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for the shipping conference to demand top rates for its
services
.
Although the American subsidized liner company has
the power to influence the market, it by no means exercises
monopolistic control. Preference cargos help the American
firm but are not the only source of business. As a result,
the American firm must consider foreign firms in making
pricing decisions.
2 . U.S. Tramp Trade
In the tramp trade U.S. vessels are primarily en-
gaged in bulk transport. Cargos are of the type best suited
for transport in tankers or other types of bulk carriers.
U.S. tramp operators carry preference cargos under ?.L. 480
or receive operating-differential subsidies. For preference
cargos under P.L. 480, firms are able to command premium
rates significantly higher than world rates. These rates
allow the operator to make a profit and cover the higher
costs of operating U.S. vessels. Vessel profitability is
dependent on the availability of preference cargos.
Vessels receiving operating-differential subsidy
must compete in the world market for cargos. As explained
earlier in this chapter the tramp trade is a perfectly com-
petitive industry. When demand for shipping is high, large
profits can be made. Conversely, during shipping downturns,




3 . Competition Between U.S. Liner Firms
To this point in this section, the presentation has
concentrated on U.S. Merchant Marine and how it deals with
world competition. It is now necessary to examine competi-
tion within the U.S. liner trade.
The U.S. Maritime Administration only allows one or
two subsidized carriers to trade along a subsidized route.
On profitable routes however subsidized firms often face
competition from unsubsidized U.S. firms. Since unsubsi-
dized firms can carry preference cargos the competition is
formidable. Although subsidized operators are normally not
allowed on routes that can support an unsubsidized U.S.
firm, changes in traffic patterns can create this situation.
[Ref. 10]
There is little or no competition in obtaining sub-
sidized trade routes from the U.S. Maritime Administration.
Most subsidized carriers have serviced their present routes
since the subsidy program began or acquired routes by pur-
chase from firms leaving the industry. During the mid-1970s
most subsidized firms re-negotiated their operating-differ-
ential subsidy contracts for another twenty year period.
During this period there was no competition from other firms
seeking to obtain contracts from incumbent firms. For sub-
sidized firms to move to different routes involves extensive
hearings at which comments from other firms in the industry
are received and considered. The Maritime Administration is
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reluctant to approve a change that will adversely affect an
established firm.
F . SUMMARY
This chapter has presented a description of the ocean
shipping marketplace. The place of U.S. flag vessels in
this market was described. Most U.S. vessels engaged in
foreign trade are liners. Aided by the conference system
and preference cargos, it was shown that liners are generally
able to cover costs and make a profit through freight rates.
Since the user fee is a cost, the presentation in this chap-
ter points to U.S. liners covering the user fee through
higher freight rates.
U.S. vessels engaged in charter or tramp service are
almost exclusively bulk carriers. U.S. firms are able to
compete in this business due to preference cargos and
operating-differential subsidy. Vessels carrying preference
cargos cover costs through premium freight rates. Vessels
receiving operating-differential subsidies must compete in
the world markets for bulk cargos. The world shipping mar-
ket for these cargos is a perfectly competitive industry.
During periods of over capacity vessel operators are unable
to cover costs. To absorb increased costs such as the Coast
Guard user fee firms must rely on assets, borrowing and
revenues to cover costs. Firms that are unable to generate
cash to fund the losses that result from the low freight
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rates of periods of over capacity are often forced to leave
the industry.
This chapter has developed important considerations in
analyzing the effect of the Coast Guard user fee on the U.S
Merchant Marine. The next chapter presents the details of
the proposed Coast Guard user fees.
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VI. THE USER FES IDEA
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the mechanics of the development
of the user fee program as proposed by the U.S. Coast Guard.
The most current fee schedule, which is the basis for the




The idea to fund federal government services by means of
user's fees is not a new one. A fee system has been in use
for funding the services provided by the U.S. National Park
Service for a number of years. A user fee system has also
been developed and is presently operating in conjuction with
the towboat and barge industries' usage of the U.S. inland
waterways system. The idea to fund those services provided
by the U.S. Coast Guard to the maritime community by charging
user fees has often been brought forward for the scrutiny of
the Congressional Committees on Appropriations since the
early 1950s, but for whatever reason has never gone beyond
discussion. President Reagan's program for economic re-
covery has now tasked the Coast Guard with development of a




That the effect of a user fee will be a contribution to
inflation is a frequently encountered argument against its
use. Literature included in the Coast Guard proposed user
fee package maintains, however, that the costs of providing
Coast Guard services are present whether financed from
general tax revenues or from user charges, and that the
increase in cost to the groups who would be paying a user
charge is offset by the lesser expenditure required from the
U.S. Treasury to finance the cost of the services. It fur-
ther cites the effect of the user charge to be a shift in
the burden of payment from the general U.S. taxpayer to the
primary beneficiary of the service being funded, and because
the user charge results in a more equitable distribution as
well as a more optimal allocation of society's resources,
the effect will not be inflationary especially in the long
run.
The criterion used by the Coast Guard in evaluating the
user fee mechanism was essentially determined through the
use of three tests: a) a test of equity, b) a test of eco-
nomic efficiency, c) and a test of administrative simplicity
In the test of equity there are three primary questions
to be answered: a) Is it fair to recover the costs of pro-
viding services from only those who use the services, or
should the whole nation share in the expense? b) What is
fair in terms of the distribution of the payment burden
among the user groups? c) And finally, what is fair in
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treatment of private user groups in competition with each
other? The Coast Guard maintains the policy that there
should be equal treatment unless there are extenuating cir-
cumstances and these ideals have been considered foremost in
development of the proposed user fee schedules.
The primary question concerned with the test of economic
efficiency is: Will the system be able to provide the level
of output of goods and services needed at the least cost
over a given period of time? It has been said that when
services are funded by the nation's taxpayers , there is an
incentive for beneficiaries to request the maximum level of
service that they are able to obtain without any regard for
cost. The Coast Guard maintains the theory that user charges
will create an incentive for the beneficiaries of services
to limit their requests for services to a level at which the
benefits exceed or at least equal the cost. User charges
may also provide an incentive for the users to watch that
the public agency providing the services is allocating its
resources in an efficient manner.
The last test, administrative simplicity, recognizes
that there will be costs for collection involved in a user
fee system that are not present in the general taxpayer
funding. The additional cost must be weighed against the
gains in equity and efficiency. Since it is obvious that at
some level the administrative burden will reach a point
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where it is so high in relation to the fees collected that
it would make the system unfeasible.
The Coast Guard has divided its service beneficiaries
into several groups and developed proposed fee schedules and
collection mechanisms for each. These schedules are all
entirely different and since they are only proposals not yet
approved, this study will describe only the schedule
directed to commercial vessels engaged in foreign trade.
There are two categories of Coast Guard services pro-
vided to commercial vessels engaged in foreign trade. The
first is for direct services which includes the functions of
issuing or renewing vessel documentations, issuing initial
vessel admeasurements, and engagement in various marine
safety oriented vessel inspections. The proposed demonstra-
tion fee schedule for providing these services is summarized
in Table XII.
It can readily be observed that the only fees of any
major financial consequence are those in the categories of
Admeasurement and Initial Inspection. Admeasurement and the
Initial Inspections are concerned with newly constructed
vessels and are one time only occurrences. The cost of put-
ting a 4000 gross ton ship into operation or delivery by the
builder would come to $109,520. Amortized over five years
until the next survey would mean $22,000 per year (or about
$4,500 per voyage for a ship averaging 5 voyages per year).












Less than 7 5 G.T.
7 5 to 274 G.T.
275 to 999 G.T.
1,000 to 3,999 G.T.






Less than 300 G.T.
Over 300 G.T.
All barges
Less than 300 G.T.
Over 300 G.T.
All barges






















(Source: U.S. Coast Guard Proposed User Fee Package March
1982)
over 4000 gross tons than to the large 30,000 and over gross
ton ships, as the fee is not proportional to the ratio of
profit capability of the ship.
The collection for direct services would be by the Coast
Guard Marine Safety Office handling those services. Collec-
tion costs are considered to be negligible. The proposed
direct service fees are not going to be included in the
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scope of this study as their major impact will be on the
U.S. shipbuilding industry.
The second service category provided to commercial ves-
sels engaged in foreign trade is for those indirect services
described in chapter I. The fee collection will be based on
the gross tonnage of the vessel each time the vessel enters
a U.S. port from a foreign port of origin. Each vessel will
be subject to the charge only for the first five entries per
calendar year. The proposed 1982 fee schedule calls for
$.20 per gross ton for all vessels engaged in U.S. /foreign
trade including vessels of foreign registry entering U.S.
ports. Because the U.S. Customs Service already collects
such a fee from vessels engaged in foreign trade, the estab-
lishment and administration of such a fee for the Coast
Guard indirect services would be relatively simple.
C. SUMMARY
It is the effect of the indirect user fee on the U.S.
Merchant Marine engaged in foreign trade that is the major
thrust of this thesis. The effect of the user fee will be
applied using the case study method as explained in chapter
VII with the cases following in chapter VIII.
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VII. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the format in
which the case studies of chapter VIII are presented. A
standard method has been adopted for presenting the cases
.
This standard format was adopted to allow the reader to
quickly get to the heart of the matter and to easily make
comparisons between the cases. Although cases are presented
in a standard format, care has been taken to ensure that
unique characteristics of a firm do not get neglected simply
because these characteristics do not fit the mold.
B. SHIPPING COMPANY SELECTION
Eight U.S. flag shipping firms were selected according
to the following criteria:
1. That both large and small firms be represented.
2. That both government subsidized and unsubsidized firms
be represented.
3. That both liner and bulk carrier firms be represented.
4. That East Coast, West Coast, and Gulf Coast firms be
represented.
The reason for this representation was to enable the re-
searchers to look for any particular disparities of impact





The case studies begin with a brief description of the
company. Included is a description of some of the products
carried by the firm. Tables are presented detailing impor-
tant aspects of operations. Where available the following
data is provided:
1. Description of the company's fleet.
2. Abbreviated income statements and balance sheets for
the years 1978 through 1980.
3. Trade routes serviced and duration of operating-
differential subsidy contracts (ODS)
.
4. Operating-differential subsidy accruals through 1930.
5. Number of voyages per year.
A description of the company's fleet and the number of
voyages per year is needed to calculate user fee costs.
Balance sheet data is needed to assess the likelihood of the
firm remaining in the industry. Operating-differential sub-
sidy data illustrates the relative importance of this program
to the firm and provides clues as to the degree of competi-
tion experienced along the firms' trade routes. Finally, a
description of trade routes is provided to assist in assess-
ing the competition the firm must face
.
From the data contained in the tables an estimate of
total fee expenses for the firm is calculated for 1978
through 1980. The mechanics of the calculation is explained
in section C of this chapter. Total fee expense is then
applied to selected data in the tables for comparison
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purposes. The fee comparisons to be made are described in
section D of this chapter.
The case studies include summarized comments of company
officials regarding the user fee. Of particular importance
are comments regarding the ability of the firm to absorb, or
pass on the fee. Comments of company officials were ob-
tained in interviews conducted during the spring of 1982.
Section F of this chapter contains a standard set of ques-
tions that provided the basis for the interviews. Inter-
views were conducted in person and via the telephone.
Most of the firms that are the subject of case studies
in this thesis are represented by trade associations. The
primary purpose of the trade associations is to lobby for
U.S. steamship companies. As a part of the case studies,
separate sections are included on the views of trade asso-
ciations regarding the user fee.
The proposed Coast Guard fee is based on the proposed
Coast Guard operating budget for 1982. The fee is therefore
inadequate for use with 1978 through 1980 data. To solve
this problem a price index has been developed to adjust the
fee to constant dollars for each year. The mechanics of
this index are described in section E of this chapter.
D. CALCULATION OF FEE COSTS
Calculation of annual fee costs for a steamship company
is a simple task. Total fee costs for the company is simply
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the sum of the fee costs for each individual ship in the
company's fleet. The following formula conveniently ex-
presses the fee cost calculations for each ship.
TFC = (GT) x (V) x (F)
where
TFC = total fee cost for a ship per year
F = user fee per gross ton per entry
GT = size of the ship measured in gross tons
V = number of entries at a U.S. port per year.
As explained in chapter II section B, the user fee will
only be charged for the first 5 entries at a U.S. port. In
this study V = 5 in all cases. All of the companies chosen
as case study subjects indicated that their ships make at
least five entries per year at U.S. ports.
E. APPLICATION OF TOTAL FEE COSTS
A firm experiencing additional costs can do one of three
things with these costs. Costs can be:
1. Passed forward to customers in the form of higher
prices
.
2. Absorbed by the firm.
3. Passed back to suppliers by demanding lower prices for
inputs
As part of the case studies total fee costs will be ap-
plied to company income statements. This will provide a feel
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for the firm's ability to absorb the fee should this become
necessary.
To accomplish this, company revenues, expenses, net in-
come and the operating-differential subsidy are presented in
table format. Alongside these items is presented estimated
total fee costs expressed as a percentage of each item.
F. PRICE INDEX
The proposed Coast Guard user fee is based on the pro-
posed Coast Guard operating budget for 1982. Obviously the
fee cannot be immediately applied to 1978 through 1980 with-
out considering inflation. To deal with this problem a price
index must be developed.
There are many different price indices that could be de-
veloped to deal with this problem. This study uses an index
based on actual Coast Guard operating expenditures for 1978
through 1980. Table XIII shows actual Coast Guard operating
expenses for 1978 through 1980 broken down by program acti-
vity. It also shows each program activity as a percentage
of total activity. Table XIV provided the same information
for 1982. It can be observed that the expenditures by pro-
gram category are very similar for the four years. This is
significant as the user fee is heavily dependent on funds
expended on programs 1 through 3
.
A second important factor in developing the user fee is
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Proposed Coast Guard Operating Expenses 1982
(in millions of dollars)
Dollar % of Total Direct
Program Amount Program Costs
1. Search and rescue 369 26
2. Aids to navigation 338 24
3. Marine safety 202 14
4. Marine environmental 107 8
Protection
5. Enforcement of Laws 261 19
and Treaties
6. Marine science and 72 5
polar operations
7. Military readiness 62 4
Total direct
Program costs: 1411
(Source: Department of Transportation Budget Data)
allocated. For the purpose of this index a simplifying as-
sumption is made. It is assumed that the total number of
users is constant for 1978 through 1982. This assumption
would be difficult to verify and is beyond the scope of this
thesis
.
Based on this price index the user fee is adjusted to








F 1QVV = fee per gross ton for 1978, 1979 or 1980l yxx
OE
1 Q = actual operating expenditures for 1978iyxx through 198
F 1982 = ProPosed fee Per gross ton for 1982
OB = proposed operating budget for 1982.
To illustrate how this formula is utilized the fee for
1980 is calculated as follows:
F 1980
= fee for 198 °
OE 1980 = l'^^ d-n millions of dollars)
F 1982 = 5.20 per gross ton









x 2011 1980 1,411 X * ZU
Similar calculations were performed for 1978 and 1979.
The results are presented in Table XV.
TABLE XV














To make this study operationally meaningful, company
officials, trade associations, and other individuals knowl-
edgeable in the industry were contacted and asked to comment
on the proposed Coast Guard user fee. Most of the firms
selected for case study were curious. The comments and data
supplied added a great deal to the case study. For other
firms, financial data was not supplied. Although this lack
of data detracted from the case it did not preclude obtain-
ing meaningful results.
Comments were solicited through interviews conducted in
person and via telephone interviews. In conducting the
interviews, a basic list of questions was developed to guide
the discussion. Figure 7.1 is the list of questions ad-





1. Please provide the following data for your fiscal
years 1978 through 1980.
a. Income statements and balance sheets (including




c. The number of times each ship entered the U.S.
during the year.
d. A description of your fleet including the size
of each vessel measured in gross tons.
e. A profile of the type of cargo carried.
f. A list of your major customers and what they
generally ship.
g. A profile of your competition.
h. The amount of cargo you carried measured in tons
2. Is there anything unusual in operations from 1978 to
1980 that should be considered in our analysis?
3. Why do your customers ship with you? Why don't they
use your competitors?
4. For subsidized firms : Did you experience any compe-
tition from other U.S. firms when renewing your
operating-differential subsidy contract?
5. For unsubsidized firms: How are you able to compete
without a subsidy?
6. What are your prospects for continuing in business
over the next 5 to 10 years without the user fee?
With the user fee?
7. Should a fee be enacted will you absorb it or pass
it on to suppliers, customers or the Federal Mari-
time Administration (MARAD)
?
8. What do you think the competition will do with the
user fee?
9. What type of influence does your firm have in set-
ting freight rates along your trade routes?
10. Would the user fee as proposed have an impact on
the size of your fleet?
11. A user fee raises costs. An analogous situation may
be the rise in the price of fuel during the 1970s.
How did your firm handle fuel price increases?






This chapter contains case studies on eight firms. In
addition the comments of two steamship trade associations
are also summarized. Four of the firms receive subsidies
under the liner trade program and two of the firms receive
subsidies under the bulk trade program. Two of the firms
are owned by the same parent organization. The case study
firms and the trade association interview summaries are pre-
sented in the following order:
Firm
1. Delta Steamship Lines Inc.
2. American President Lines Ltd.
3. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.
4. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. Inc.
5
.
Moore-McCormack Bulk Transport Inc
.
S The Berger Group
7. Keystone Shipping Co.
3 Sea-Land Services Inc
.
9. American Institute of Merchant Shipping
















Delta Steamship Lines Inc. was incorporated in
Louisiana in March of 1919 as the Mississippi Shipping
Corporation. The present name, Delta Steamship Lines, was
adopted on April 23, 1962. All of the firm's outstanding
stock is currently held by Holiday Inns Incorporated.
Shipments from the United States consist primarily
of industrial chemicals, automobiles and parts, agricultural
machinery, industrial equipment, agricultural products, and
finished consumer goods. Principal cargos to the United
States are ores, machinery parts, steel, coffee, fresh and
frozen fruits, and juices.
2
.
Comments of Company Official
A compnay official of Delta Lines Inc. was inter-
viewed in April of 1932 at the firm's Washington, D.C. of-
fice. Company views regarding the fee and their place in
the ocean shipping market place are as follows:
Delta is able to attract customers due to a reputa-
tion for fast, reliable service that has been developed over
the years. In the South American trade, Delta pioneered a
method of shipping bananas that substantially cut loss and
spoilage. Delta also attracts many customers in that it is
the only carrier offering LASH service on some South Ameri-
can trade routes. Some U.S. shippers choose Delta because
is the only U.S. firm serving ports along its trade routes.
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These shippers have a policy of using U.S. carriers when
possible. Finally Delta is a member of the conferences
established on its trade routes. For this reason, Delta's
rates are the same as other liners competing with Delta.
Delta is able to exercise considerable influence
along its trade routes serving South America for two basic
reasons. First, South American governments have developed
pooling arrangements which require that most cargo be shared
between U.S. and South American carriers. Third flag car-
riers are allowed to operate along these routes but are
allotted a smaller share of the cargo. As a result, the
conferences in this area work very well. Secondly, Delta
operates most of the tonnage along its trade routes. As
one of the larger operators, it is able to exert signifi-
cant influence within the conference.
Delta also services West Africa. The conferences in
this trade are weak and competition is fierce, often ap-
proaching the cutthroat competition common to the charter
business. At present, the West Africa trade is a poor per-
former for Delta. Management is speculating however, that
this conference situation will improve and the trade will
become profitable in the near future.
Delta Lines is a profitable firm and expects to stay
in business for many years to come. The company has a capi-
tal budget plan that calls for the replacement of ships as
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they reach the end of their service life. The years 1978
through 1980 were not typical years for Delta. In 1978 and
1979, profits were off due to the acquisition of the vessels
and trade routes of the former Grace Line. The year 1980
was an unusually good year. On average, the firm expects
net profits to be in the 25-30 million dollar range.
Increased costs such as user fees must be either ab-
sorbed by the steamship company or passed on to the customer
U.S. steamship companies are unable to pass costs on to sup-
pliers. It is doubtful if the user fee could be passed on
to the federal government in the form of higher subsidies.
Steamship firms have three primary suppliers. These
are labor unions, shipyards, and oil companies. It is well
established that steamship companies operating U.S. vessels
cannot pass increased costs to U.S. labor unions or U.S.
shipyards. These suppliers are the primary reasons U.S.
flag operators require subsidies. In addition, the shipping
industry is unable to significantly affect oil prices. Ship
owners have had to deal with spiraling oil prices as have
other industries.
As explained in chapter III, operating differential
subsidies are only paid for differences in costs such as
wages. The user fee would not qualify since it is applied
to all vessels. Even if foreign governments paid the user
fee for its ships, it is doubtful that U.S. vessel subsidies
would be raised. The Reagan administration is opposed to
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subsidies and is carefully examining the current subsidy
practices
.
The Delta official indicated that the Conferences
would eventually pass the fee on to customers through higher
rates. Estimates were made of total fee costs by the Delta
official. These estimates indicated that the fee was small
in comparison to revenues and profits. For this reason,
conferences would not feel a need to immediately adjust
shipping rates. As a result, shipping companies would ini-
tially have to absorb the fee. This would not create a
problem for Delta. Because the fee is small, it is quite
possible that when conferences did attempt to adjust rates
to compensate for it, the effect would be masked by other
factors.
The user fee would not affect the number of ships
Delta operates. The present number of ships is needed to
ensure the company can provide on time service.
Although the magnitude of the fee is of little con-
sequence to Delta, the concept is disturbing. The Coast
Guard is only one of many Federal agencies that provide
service to the U.S. Merchant Marine. If other agencies,
principally the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, also recovered
costs through fees, the costs would soon be substantial.
Another more important concern to Delta regarding
the fee is fear of retaliation on the part of other coun-
tries. Delta feels most countries on its routes would enact
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a similar fee in response to the Coast Guard fee. In the
process, it is likely that many of the South American na-
tions would exempt each other from the fee. The result to
Delta would be 5 or 6 fees as compared to South American
vessels paying only one. This would hurt Delta lines.
There is little chance of more subsidies to offset this.
Primarily for this reason, Delta opposes the user fee and
intends to oppose enactment of it.
3 . Vital Operating Data
TABLE XVI
Delta Lines Abbreviated Income Statement
(in millions)
1980 1979 1978
Revenues 378.8 274.4 148.3
Expenses
:
Vessel Operating Expenses Net
of Operating-Differential
Subsidy (less depreciation
and charter expenses) 290.9 223.5
Vessel Operating Expenses Net
of Operating-Differential
Subsidy 133.4
Other 47.0 42.1 14.3
Income Before Taxes 40.9 8.8 .6
Return on Investment % 15 3.7 .28




Delta Lines Balance Sheet
Total
(in millions of dollars)
As of December 31,
1980 1979 1978
ets
Current assets 72.9 78.8 57.9
Construction fund 50.9 7.9 4.0
Net vessels and equipment 143.8 146.6 153.5








































LASH 3 32,325 96,975
Breakbulk 3 9,827 29,481
Breakbulk 5 10,396 51,980
Breakbulk 6 9,313 55,378
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C. AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD.
1 . Company Background
American President Lines, Ltd. was originally incor-
porated in the state of Delaware in August, 1929 as the Dol-
lar Steamship Lines Inc. The present name was adopted in
1938. All of the company's outstanding stock is presently
owned by Natomas Transportation Company, which acquired the
stock in 1979.
American President Lines (APL) is a United States
flag carrier which has operated under government operating
differential subsidy since 1938. APL provides scheduled
liner services between ports in California, Oregon, and
Washington to ports in Japan, Hong Kong, The Philippines,
Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, and privilege calls on the U.S.S.R.
and China.
Shipments from the United States consist mainly of
raw materials and government generated cargos carried
throughout the Pacific. Imports consist mainly of manufac-
tured consumer goods (textiles, electronics, etc.). Military
generated preference cargo accounts for between 25 to 30 per-
cent of the outbound totals, and only a slightly less per-
centage of the inbound.
APL operated 17 container, and 5 breakbulk ships on
three liner and one tramp trade route systems during the
period from 1978 through 1980.
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2 . Comments by American President Line Official
A senior company official was interviewed in April
1982, concerning the company's views associated with the
Coast Guard user fee. The questions listed in chapter V
formed the basis for the discussion.
The company official stated that the Coast Guard
user fee, as proposed, would not have a significant impact
on his company, however he expressed some concern that this
fee coupled with other proposed federal agency fees might
trigger a retaliation from other foreign governments and
could lead into a substantial financial burden. Since the
Reagan Administration doesn't like subsidies, the chance of
increasing subsidies in response to retaliation is low. He
believed the proposed Coast Guard user fee costs would be
passed on to the shipping customers in the form of a sur-
charge to the conference charge list in a way similar to how
the fuel surcharges are presently handled. Because of the
small size of the fee, however, conferences would not rush
to up the freight rates. There is no way APL could get sup-
pliers to help with fee costs. The company must keep the
present number of ships in service if it is to maintain its
reputation. He further stated that APL was highly influen-
tial in the rate setting of the conferences in which it
belongs, and credited the intermodal service and APL ' s repu-
tation for being "dependable and on time" as the reason
their customers shipped with them.
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American President Lines feels it will remain in
business with or without the user fee. The company has
plans to replace ships as they wear out. The user fee will
probably have little impact on ship buying decisions.
3 . Vital Operating Data
TABLE XXII





Gain on Disposition of Assets
Total Expenses
Net Income Before Taxes
Return on Investment % 7.7 12.7 12.6
(Source: Moody's Transportation Manual 1981)
576.3 498.6 417.0
67.5 33.9 26.6






American President Lines Balance Sheet
(in millions of dollars)


















(Source: Moody's Transportation Manual 1981)
TABLE XXIV
The American President Lines Fleet 1978 Through 1980


















Breakbulk 5 15,949 79,745
Container 4 21,467 85,368
Container 4 17,301 71,204
Container 4 16,518 66,072
Container 3 26,990 80,970
Container 2 13,367 26,734
Total 22 410,593
















Far East 4 12/31/1997 26
Trans-Pacific 4 12/31/1997 26
California -
Far East 9 12/31/1997 52
Tramp Service 5 n/a 25
(Source: American Preside
TABLE XXVI














Annual Fee Costs to APL
1980 1979 1978
Estimated Fee $.17 per GT $.15 $.15
Total Fee $349,004 $307,945 $307,945





D. MOORE-MCCORMACK LINES INC.
1 . Background
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. is a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of Moore-McCormack Resources, Inc. Moore-McCormack
operates U.S. flag vessels in international trade. All of
the firm's vessels are subsidized under the operating-
differential subsidy program. The company operates 13
general cargo ships. Outbound from the U.S. the ships prin-
cipally carry machinery and parts, transportation equipment,
chemicals, textiles, textile products, and military cargos.




2. Comments by Company Official
A company official of Moore-McCormack Resources was
interviewed in April 1982 at the firm's Washington D.C.
office. Company views regarding the user fee and the com-
pany's place in the ocean shipping marketplace are as
follows:
The conferences Moore-McCormack belong to along its
South American routes are very effective. This is due to
pooling arrangements backed by South American governments.
Under these pooling arrangements 40% of the cargo is re-
served for South American vessels, 40% goes to U.S. vessels
and 20% is available to ships of other nations. Preference
cargos are not significant along the South American routes.
The user fee costs should be passed along on these routes
.
Because the fee is small, these costs may not be passed
immediately.
Moore-McCormack also provides service to East Africa
The conferences serving these routes are weak and for this
reason competition at times approaches the rigorous competi-
tion of the charter business. Future prospects for these
routes becoming profitable are promising. At present, the
ability of Moore-McCormack to pass the user fee costs on
along these routes is uncertain due to the competition on
these routes.
Moore-McCormack is not opposed to the user fee. The
magnitude of the fee is not significant and the concept of
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charging users is valid. If a user fee is to be enacted it
must be applied in a fair and equitable manner. Commercial
operators should not subsidize recreation boaters. Moore-
McCormack should remain in business with or without the
fee. The company plans to buy more ships as the present
ships reach the end of their service life. The user fee
would not have a sizable impact on this.
The company is concerned that other nations will
enact a user fee in response to a Coast Guard user fee.
Moore-McCormack speculates that should other nations develop
a fee many would agree not to charge each other. This would
put the company at a competitive disadvantage with the
foreign flag vessels paying only one fee while Moore-
McCormack vessels would be paying several. This would de-
tract from the company's ability to remain in the liner
market. Since the Reagan Administration is opposed to sub-
sidies, it is unlikely they will increase them in response
to any foreign retaliation.
Moore-McCormack ships make at least five voyages
from U.S. ports each year. A user fee would not cause the
company to layup any of its ships. All of the ships are
needed to meet the demands of the liner business. There




3 . Vital Operating Data
TABLE XXVIII
Moore-McCormack Lines Income Data
(in millions)
1980 1979 1978
Sales and Revenues 177.5 135.1 117.3
Operating Profits 23.4 16.5 16.0
Return on Investment % 23.1 17.6 13.2
(Source: Notes accompanying the consolidated income state-
ment of Moore McCormack Resources Inc. as published in the
1980 annual report.)
TABLE XXIX
Moore-McCormack Lines Balance Sheet Data
(in millions)
1980 1979 1978
Assets 101.2 93.5 87.9
Capital Expenditures 14.8 5.1 .7
(Source: Notes accompanying the consolidated balance
sheet of Moore-McCormack Resources Inc. as published in




The Moore-McCormack Lines Fleet 1978 Through 1980
Gross Tons Gross Tons
Type Number Per Ship Per Class
Breakbulk 4 10,484 41,936
Breakbulk 5 9,258 46,290
Breakbulk 4 14,001 56,004
Total 13 114,230
(Source: Moore-McCormack Resources Inc. annual report 1980)
TABLE XXXI




East Coast of South
America
U.S. Atlantic to
South and East Africa

















Total ODS Accruals 571.0 549.2 529.2
ODS Total for Year 21.8 20.0 25.2
TABLE XXXIII
Annual Fee Costs to Moore-McCormack Lines
1980 1979 1978
Estimated Fee
(per gross ton) $.17 $.15 $.15
Total Fee $122,596 $108,173 $108,173















Lykes Brothers Steamship Company, Inc. of New
Orleans, Louisana was acquired by the LTV Corporation in
December of 1978 and is presently a subsidiary of that firm.
Lykes provides service from the U.S. Gulf Coast to most re-
gions in the world. Exports from the United States carried
by Lykes 1 ships consist principally of machinery, vehicles
and troop support material. Imports to the United States
consist mainly of ores and metals. Preference cargos are a
significant portion of the firm's business. All Lykes ships
are subsidized under the ^operating-differential subsidy
program.
2 Comments of Company Official
The Washington D.C. office of Lykes Brothers Steam-
ship Company was contacted in April 1982. A representative
from this office indicated there was no reason to discuss
the Coast Guard user fee with these researchers . Lykes
'
views had been presented to the Council of American Flag
Ship Operators (CASO) . The CASO view of the user fee was
Lykes 1 view of the user fee. The representative was un-
willing to discuss Lykes operations.
3. Vital Operating Data
Vital operating data and estimates of total fee
costs are provided in the following tables. Data for the
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firm before 1979 is not available. Balance sheet data was
not available for any of the years 1978 through 1980.
TABLE XXXIV




Operating Income 35.6 19.8
(Source: From notes to the consolidated income statement of
LTV Corporation as published in the 1980 annual report.)
TABLE XXXV
The Lykes Fleet 1979 Through 1980
Gross Tons Gross Tons
Type Number Per Ship Per Class
LASH 3 33,350 100,050
Breakbulk/Container 8 9,398 75,184
Breakbulk/Container 12 11,391 142,692
Breakbulk /Container 5 11,500 57,500
Breakbulk/Container 13 11,891 154,583
Container 2 12,600 25,200
Container 1 16,150 16,150
Total 44 571,359




Lykes Trade Routes 197 9 Through 1980
Trade Route
U.S. Gulf /U.K. -Continent
U.S. Gulf /Mediterranean
U.S. Gulf/Far East
U.S. Gulf /South and East Africa
U.S. Gulf/West Cost South America
U.S. West Coast/North Pacific
U.S. West Coast/South Pacific











Lykes Accrued Operating-Differential Subsidies
(in millions)
1980 1979
Total ODS Accruals 887.7 802.2




Annual Fee Costs to Lykes
1930 1979
Estimated Fee
(per gross ton) $.17 $.15
Total Fee $485,655 $428,519





••••Operating Income 1.4 2.2
F. MOORE-MCCORMACK BULK TRANSPORT INC.
1 . Company Background
Moore-McCormack Bulk Trasnport Inc. is a subsidiary
of Moore-McCormack Resources Inc. This company operates a
fleet of 10 U.S. flag bulk carriers operating on the Great
Lakes and three U.S. flag tankers engaged in ocean shipping.
The three ocean-going tankers are on seven year charter to
the Shell International Petroleum Company Ltd. All three
of the vessels receive operating-differential subsidies from
the Maritime Administration. The company is also engaged in
a liquified natural gas (LNG) shipping project that com-
menced in 1981. The company constructed two LNG tankers as
a result of this project.
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Moore-McCormack Bulk Transport entered the ocean
tanker business in the early 1970s. At this time Moore-
McCormack wanted to sell several unprofitable passenger
ships to a foreign company. Since these vessels were con-
structed under subsidy, approval was required from the
Maritime Administration. As part of the approval to sell
these ships, Moore-McCormack agreed to construct and operate
three U.S. flag tankers in international trade.
2 . Comments of Company Officials
An interview was conducted with a representative
from Moore-McCormack Resources in April 1982 at the firm's
Washington D.C. office. .Comments concerning ocean tanker
operations are as follows:
Shell Oil Company has mainly been using the tankers
as part of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve Project. Cargos
carried under this program are preference cargos.
Under the terms of the charter, Moore-McCormack will
be able to pass a user charge on to Shell Oil. In 1980 con-
ditions looked good for rechartering the vessels when the
charters expired. At present the outlook is less favorable
due to the present over-capacity situation in the ranker
market. There is little hope of passing fees on to suppliers
It is difficult for Moore-McCormack tankers to be
used in the domestic trades. As a prerequisite, approval
must be obtained from the Maritime Administration. In addi-
tion, since these vessels were constructed under subsidy, a
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portion of the construction differential subsidy would have
to be returned. The poor condition of the tanker market
makes these additional costs prohibitive.
Moore-McCormack is not opposed to a user fee as long
as it is fairly applied. Commercial operators should not
have to subsidize the recreation boater. The company is
concerned that other nations will enact a similar fee in re-
taliation to the Coast Guard user fee. In response, many
countries may agree not to charge each other's vessels.
This would make it difficult for Moore-McCormack tankers to
compete in the tanker markets even with operating-differential
subsidies. Since the Reagan Administration is against sub-
sidies, it would be unlikely that the Maritime Administra-
tion would increase the scope of the subsidy program to
include costs of retaliation.
3 . Vital Operating Data
Income data is not available on ocean tanker opera-
tions. For this reason a simplifying assumption is made to
estimate tanker revenues. This assumption is explained in
Table XXXIX. Balance sheet data is not available for ocean
shipping operations. It would be difficult to estimate rele-
vant balance sheet items applicable to ocean tanker opera-
tions. A table on tanker routes is not provided since the
tankers do not necessarily operate along specific routes as
do liners. Other data related to ocean tanker operations is




Moore-McCormack Bulk Transport Income Data
(in millions)
1980 1979 1978











(Source: Notes accompanying the consolidated income state-
ment of Moore McCormack Resources Inc. as published in the
1980 annual report.)
Note: Revenues and operating profit for ocean tankers are
not shown separately in the annual report. To develop the
estimate the simplifying assumption is made that Great Lakes
bulk carriers and ocean tankers produce the same revenues
and operating profits per deadweight-ton. Ocean tankers
account for approximately 28.5% of the deadweight-tons of
the fleet. It is assumed therefore that 28.5% of revenues
and profits are attributed to ocean tanker operations.
TABLE XL












Moore-McCormack Bulk Operating-Differential Subsidies
(in millions)
1980 1979 1978
Total ODS Accruals 21.1 12.3 9.2
ODS Total for Year 8.3 3.1 4.1
TABLE XLII
Annual Fee Costs to Moore-McCormack for Tanker Operations
1980 1979 1978
Estimated Fee
(per gross ton) $.17 $.15 $.15
Total Fee $57,566 $50,793 $50,793
User Fee Costs as % of:
1980 1979 1978
% % Q.O
****Revenues .4 .3 .3
****ODS .7 1.6 1.2
••••Operating Profit 1.3 1.2 1.0
G. THE BERGER GROUP
1 . Background and Comments
A telephone interview was conducted with a representa-
tive of the Berger Group in April 1982. The representative
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provided a description of the firm and commented on the pro-
posed Coast Guard user fee.
Berger Group with headquarters in Long Island, New
York, is a firm engaged in the tanker and bulk carrier busi-
ness. Subsidiaries of the firm operate a fleet of sixteen
U.S. flag tankers and bulk carriers. Vessels are time char-
tered to Texaco and Amerada Hess. These firms use the ves-
sels in both domestic and international trade as the needs
of the companies dictate. Nine of the vessels are operated
under operating-differential subsidy.
Berger Group is opposed to the user fee. The company
recently renegotiated many of its time charters. The char-
ters run for a period of several years. Company officials
have examined the charters and do not believe that the Coast
Guard user fee can be passed on to the oil companies. In the
present depressed tanker market, the charter revenues barely
cover costs. For these reasons, the user fee will be harmful
to the Berger Group.
2 . Vital Operating Data
The Berger Group is a privately held company. For
this reason financial data is not available. Tables follow
showing the Berger Group fleet and the estimated annual fee




The Berger Group Fleet 1978 Through 1980
Gross Tons Gross Tons
Type Number Per Ship Per Class
VLCC 2 139,166 278,332
Tanker 7 44,260 309,820
OBO 2 40,236 80,472
Tanker 1 22,500 22,500
Tanker 4 14,445 57,780
Total 16 748,907
(Source: B<srger Group Coripany Official)
VLCC = Very Large Crude Carrier; OBO = Oil, Bulk, Ore Carrier
TABLE XLIV
Berger Group Accrued Operating-Differential Subsidies
Total ODS Accruals

























Keystone Shipping Company of Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania operates a fleet of 24 oil tankers and chemical car-
riers. Most of the company's ships operate in the U.S.
domestic trade. Five ships regularly operate in the inter-
national bulk trades and receive operating-differential
subsidies. In addition to the five regularly subsidized
ships, three others occasionally operate in the interna-
tional trade without subsidy. These vessels are chemical
carriers. Keystone Shipping operates its regularly subsi-
dized vessels through two subsidiaries. These subsidiaries




A telephone interview was conducted with a repre-
sentative from Keystone Shipping during April of 1982.
Company comments regarding the user fee are as follows:
Keystone Shipping keeps all information regarding
its customers and its ability to compete in its markets con-
fidential. The company is very concerned about the user
fee. There is perhaps a 50-50 chance of the fee being
passed on to its customers. Because of the depressed condi-
tion of the tanker markets, the ability of the company to
survive should the fee be enacted is questionable. Keystone
opposes the Coast Guard user fee.
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3 . Vital Operating Data
Keystone Shipping is a privately held company. For
this reason, financial data is not made public. The fol-
lowing tables show the Keystone fleet, operating-differential
subsidies received, and estimate of total fee costs for the
Chestnut Shipping and Margate Shipping subsidies.
TABLE XLVI
The Keystone Fleet 1978 through 1980
Gross Tons Gross Tons
Type Number Per Ship Per Class
Regularly Subsidized:
Tanker 3 22,357 67,071
Tanker 2 44,875 39,750
Occasional International Trade Unsubsidized:
Tanker 1 14,445 14,445
Tanker 1 16,376 16,376
Tanker 1 20,572 20,572
Total 8 203,214
(Source: Keystone Company Official)
TABLE XLVI
I
Keystone Accrued Operating-Differential Subsidies
(in millions)
1980 1979 1978
Total ODS Accruals 42.7 32.7 20.8




Annual Fee Costs to Keystone
1980 1979 1978
Estimated Fee
(per gross ton) $.17 $.15 $.15
Total Fee $176,982 $156,160 $156,160
Note: Estimated fee costs assume a total of 8 vessels making
at least 5 trips per year from U.S. ports.
I. SEA-LAND SERVICES INC.
1 . Background
Sea-Land Services, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary
of R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. It is a United States
flag carrier which provides scheduled containership services
to approximately 120 ports or places in more than 50 coun-
tries, including U.S. ports on the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico,
and Pacific coasts. At present, Sea-Land's most important
trade routes are between the U.S. and Europe, the Mediter-
ranean, and the Far East. Sea-Land also provides a limited
coastal U.S. service between the continental U.S. and Alaska.
The coastal service is not going to be considered in the case
study.
Shipments from the United States consist mainly of
raw materials and government generated cargos. Imports
consist mainly of manufactured consumer goods. Government
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generated preference cargo (military included) account for
approximately one fourth of the total.
Sea-Land operated 28 containerships on four foreign
transocean routes during the period 1978 to 1980. Sea-Land
does not partake in the U.S. government subsidy program.
2 . Comments of Sea-Land Company Official
A Sea-Land company official from the Oakland, Cali-
fornia office was interviewed in April 1982, concerning the
company's views associated with the Coast Guard user fee.
The questions listed in chapter VII formed the basis for the
discussion.
The Sea-Land official felt that his company was the
best of the American flag shipping companies and had at-
tained this position in spite of not being U.S. government
subsidized. This was attributed to the fact that they are a
very aggressive, competitive organization, and offer the
best and most on-time transportation service available.
During the 1978-1980 period, the SI 7 class containerships
formed the backbone of the Sea-Land fleet. These most ad-
vanced vessels were capable of steaming at 33 knots, which
gave them the capability to regain lost time by speeding up
whenever there had been an unforeseen delay (i.e. storm,
canal blockage, etc.). For this reason, Sea-Land has built
a reputation for reliability and punctuality which is most
important to shippers having vast sums of money riding in
the goods being shipped.
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Sea-Land's profit margin has suffered since the run-
away escalation of fuel costs which peaked in 1979. Their
high speed ships required more fuel than most of their compe-
tition's slower ships. The increased fuel costs were passed
on to the shippers in the form of conference rate fuel sur-
charges, which helped some, but was not enough to offset the
full amount. Sea-Land has recently sold its SI 7s to the
U.S. government and purchased 12 new D-9 class containerships
which are diesel powered and very economical. They are
hoping that these ships will provide them with the competi-
tive edge in which they have enjoyed in the past.
The Sea-Land official said that he had done some
quick calculations with the proposed Coast Guard user fee
($.20 per gross ton / per U.S. port entry / 5 max per year
per ship) and that he believed the fee, by itself, would not
affect his company adversely, however he considered it to be
just the tip of the iceberg. He expressed concern about the
industry being confronted with other user fees for all the
other government agencies (including state and local) that
have a working concern or provide services to the shipping
business. He also predicted that there would be foreign
government retaliation resulting from any U.S. government
user fee program which, in effect, could double or more the
total fees.
If the Coast Guard user fee program is enacted, he
believed the costs would be passed onto the shippers by
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surcharge to the conference price index. Because of the
small size of the fee costs this could be handled as a mat-
ter of routine. Sea-Land may have to absorb the costs for
some time until the conferences react. There is no way the
costs could be passed on to the suppliers such as the labor
unions. As far as the increased cost's effect on the demand
for the products shipped, he didn't think it would do any-
thing, but he did state that the effect would be felt on the
imported products before being felt on the exported raw
materials
.
He had no concern that the fee, as proposed, would
have any effect on the size or shape of Sea-Land's fleet or
on their ability to continue in business now or in the fu-
ture. Because of the small size of the fee, it would have
no impact on decisions to replace ships as they reached the
end of their service life. The present number of ships is





3 . Vital Operating Data
TABLE XLIX
Sea-Land Services Abbreviated Income Statement
(in millions)
1980 1979 1978
Revenues 1413.7 1220.4 1103.7
Operating-Differential Subsidy 00.0 00.0 00.0
Total Expenses 1347.9 1162.1 985.0





Return on Investment % 3.9 4.1 9.7
(Source: Sea-Land Industries Investments Brochure 1980)
TABLE L
Other Sea-Land Services Business Data
(in millions of dollars)
As of December 31,
1980 1979 1978
Assets 1689.9 1431.1 1227.9
Capital Expenditures 331.4 275.7 163.1
Depreciation, Depletion
and Amortization Expense 102.7 94.2 89.5
Cash Flow from Operations 209.3 148.6 166.1




The Sea-Land Services Non-Coastal Fleet 1978 Through 1980
Type Number Gross Ship Tons Gross Tons Per Class
Container 4 11,389 45,556
Container 2 11,601 23,202
Container 6 18,024 108,144
Container 4 24,774 99,096
Container 8 41,127 329,016
Container 4 17,376 69,504
Total 28 674,513
(Source: Sea-Land Services Company Official)
TABLE LI
I
Sea-Land Services Foreign Trade Routes 1978 Through 1980




SI 18 & D 6 52
CJ4, C4X, & T2 52














Annual Fee Costs to Sea-Land
1980 1979 1978
Estimated Fee $.17 per GT $.15 $.15
Total Fee $573,340 $505,889 $505,889





J. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MERCHANT SHIPPING
The American Institute of Merchant Shipping or AIMS, is
a trade association that represents U.S. flag tanker opera-
tors. Most of AIMS members operate tankers in the domestic
trade, however, one of its firms does operate tankers in the
foreign trades. AIMS maintains its office in Washington D.C
The primary purpose of the organization is to lobby for
legislation affecting the U.S. tanker industry.
A representative from AIMS was interviewed in April 1982
at the organization's Washington D.C. office. Comments re-
garding the Coast Guard user fee are as follows:
Most tanker operators will eventually be able to pass on
the user fee to its customers. AIMS members face market
conditions that approach perfect competition. For this
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reason tanker rates vary widely as the demand for shipping
changes. The terms and conditions of most time charters
would allow this fee to be passed on to shippers. The rep-
resentative was told of a comment made by a Berger Group
Official that Berger charters prevented the firm from passing
the fee on to charterers. The AIMS representative was skep-
tical about this comment. She did say, however, it may be
difficult to pass on the fee when current charters expire
due to the depressed condition of the tanker market. Even-
tually, however, the fees will be passed on. Berger Group
is not a member of AIMS.
AIMS is opposed to the Coast Guard user fee. Coast Guard
costs must be allocated based on some view of use of Coast
Guard services. At best, this allocation is an arbitrary
process that is difficult to defend. Other marine user
groups also feel this way. AIMS does not feel the Coast
Guard user fee has much chance of becoming law.
K. COUNCIL OF AMERICAN-FLAG SHIP OPERATORS
The Council of American-Flag Ship Operators or CASO is a
trade association that represents U.S. flag operators of
subsidized liners. CASO members include Delta Lines, Moore-
McCormack and Lykes. The primary purpose of CASO is to lobby
for legislation affecting U.S. subsidized lines.
A Coast Guard user fee would be difficult for some firms
to absorb at this time. The conferences serving the Pacific
126

are in disarray at this time. Pacific freight rates are, as
a result, depressed.
CASO is concerned about possible retaliation on the part
of some countries should a Coast Guard user fee be enacted.
Many third world nations are always looking for the oppor-
tunity to institute a new tax. Coast Guard user fees would
present such an opportunity. In the process of enacting a
user fee, third world nations may very likely arrange to
avoid charging nations that allowed their vessels to pass
for free. For this reason, the typical U.S. liner would
face five or six fees where foreign flag vessels may only
pay once.
Should other nations exempt each other from their own
user fees, U.S. vessels would be at a disadvantage. The
industry sees little hope for making up this disadvantage in
the form of higher subsidies from the federal government.
The Reagan administration is opposed to the idea of subsi-
dies. There is currently a freeze on new operating-
differential subsidies. The industry is concerned that the
Reagan administration may take action to eliminate subsidies
altogether.
CASO indicated there is little hope of the industry
passing the user fee costs on to suppliers such as oil com-
panies or labor unions. High labor and shipyard costs are
one reason most of the industry is subsidized.
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IX. ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the data pre-
sented in chapter VIII. The analysis seeks to identify
patterns in the effect of the proposed fee on financial data
and in the comments of company officials. Financial data
and comments are contrasted and compared. Information from
the case studies also is contrasted and compared with the
description of the ocean shipping marketplace of chapter V
and the history of the Merchant Marine presented in chapter
II.
As discussed in chapter V and VIII, there are significant
differences in the liner trades and the bulk charter trades.
For this reason, a separate analysis is provided for each.





There are several patterns in the case studies common to
both the liner and bulk trades. First, with the exception
of the Moore-McCormack companies, all of the firms are ada-
mantly opposed to the fee. Outside of economic and financial
considerations discussed later in this chapter, this comes
as no surprise. As discussed in chapter II, most Coast
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Guard services have been provided to the Merchant Marine
free of charge for well over one hundred years. The Reagan
Administration seeks to reduce inefficiencies and inequities
attributed to government that have evolved over the past 40
years. The Coast Guard was providing services free of
charge to the Merchant Marine long before big government
arrived in Washington, D.C.
Secondly, ability to deal with user fee costs is inde-
pendent of company size, fleet size, corporate structure and
location of corporate headquarters. The primary factor in
ability to deal with the user fee is the type of trade.
Liners seem to be able to absorb or pass the fee on while
bulk carriers appear to have problems absorbing or passing
on the fee. Differences in ability to absorb or pass the
fee on is discussed later in this chapter.
In chapter VI, it was shown that the user fee for ad-
measurement, initial inspection, and certification increases
dramatically for vessels over 300 gross tons. From the case
studies it can be readily observed that vessel size is much
greater than 300 gross tons. The smallest vessels in inter-
national trade are 9,000 gross tons. Based on comments of
many company officials, older vessels are generally replaced
by larger vessels. This is consistent with the history of
the Merchant Marine presented in chapter II. For these
reasons, it appears the fee structure will not influence
decision-making regarding vessel size.
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Several company officials commented that their firm
would be unable to pass the fee on to suppliers. This
statement is consistent with the history of the Merchant
Marine and the discussion provided in chapter III regarding
the subsidy programs. As discussed in these chapters,
labor, shipyards, and suppliers will not lower prices to
allow U.S. vessels to compete in international trade. High
labor and shipyard costs have been a problem for the U.S.
Merchant Marine since the days of the clipper ships. The
high costs associated with these factors of production have
historically made it difficult for this industry to compete
in international trade.
C. THE LINER TRADE
Perhaps the most striking aspect of liner case study
financial data is the magnitude of estimated fee costs. In
all cases, the fee is small in relation to revenues and pro-
fits. User fee costs are .1% or less of total revenues in
all instances. Similarly, fee costs are small (1-2% or
less) in relation to profits. During this period Delta
Lines had several off years in which user fee costs reached
39% of operating profits. A Delta company official indi-
cated however, that this was an unusual year. For Delta fee
costs represent only 1% - 2% of profits in what is con-
sidered a normal year.
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Comments of company officials are in agreement with the
financial data. All indicated that the proposed fee repre-
sented costs that would be relatively minor in relation to
revenues and other costs. If the company had to absorb the
fee costs, it would not create a problem.
All the liner companies and their trade association indi-
cated that the prospects for remaining in business over the
next 5 to 10 years look favorable. This comment applies
with or without a Coast Guard user fee. These comments are
adequately supported by balance sheet data.
For Delta Lines and American President Lines (APL) , com-
plete balance sheet data is available. From 1978 through
1980 APL assets increased from $218.0 million in 1978 to
$271.5 million in 1980 or approximately 56%. The ratio of
debt to equity remained constant during the period at ap-
proximately 1.1. Delta Line's assets increased from $366.3
million in 1978 to $573.0 million in 1980 or approximately
24%. During this period the ratio of debt to equity de-
creased from approximately 1.8 to 1.6.
For Sea-Land Services and Moore-McCormack Lines, complete
balance sheet data is not available. Sea-Land assets in-
creased from $1,227.9 million in 1978 to $1,639.9 million in
1980 or approximately 38%. Moore-McCormack Line's assets
increased from $37.9 million in 1978 to $101.2 million in
1980 or approximately 15%. Information on debt is not
available for these companies.
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As indicated in chapter VIII, balance sheet data is not
available on Lykes Bros. Steamship Company.
All of the firms experienced real growth in revenues
during the period 1978 through 1980. As shown in Table LIV,
revenue increase varied among firms from a low of 24% to a
high of 155% (3% to 106% when adjusted for inflation) for
the period.
Table LV is a summary of the ratio of income before taxes
to assets developed in chapter VIII. For the three subsi-
dized firms, return on assets averages approximately 15%.
The average return on assets was calculated by summing the
return on assets for each company for each year and dividing
by the number of returns on assets used to get the sum. The
returns on assets for Delta Lines for 1978 and 1979 were not
used since a company official indicated these were abnormal
years.
For Sea-Land Services, the one unsubsidized line, return
on assets shows a steady decline for the three year period.
Using the Standard's and Poor's Industrial Survey for
1981 and Moody's Transportation Manual 1981, the ratio of
income before taxes to assets was determined for several
transportation industries other than ocean shipping. The
ratio for three of these industries is shown in Table LVI
.
Comparing the rate of return on assets of these industries
to the U.S. liner trade one can observe that except for Sea-




Increase in Liner Revenues for 1980 as Compared with 1978











*Represents increase from 1979 to 1980 only.
Increase in revenue is calculated from income statement
tables presented in chapter VIII. The difference in revenues
from 1978 to 1980 is calculated as a percentage of revenues
for 1978 to produce this table. Straight % refers to the
increase in revenues without adjusting for inflation. Ad-
justed % is the increase in revenues after adjusting 1978
revenues to constant dollars for 1980 using the GNP deflator.
TABLE LV


















This table is a summary of the ratios of income before taxes
to assets calculated for liner companies in chapter VIII.
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average in comparison to other transportation industries.
Data concerning return on assets for water transportation as
a whole is not available.
TABLE LVI
Return on Assets for Selected Transportation Industries
1980 1979 1978
Airlines; freight .9% 6.7% 18%
Trucking 13% 17% 22%
Railroads 3% 2%
As shown in the tables of chapter VIII, the number of
ships in the company fleets remained stable during the
period 1978 through 1980. Most company officials indicated
the company had capital budget plans that called for the re-
placement of ships as they reached the end of the service
life. Financial data indicate these plans are plausible.
Because of the small costs of the Coast Guard user fee, most
companies indicated this would not be a serious consideration
in the decision to buy ships. This statement is corroborated
by the analysis of the magnitude of the user fee presented
earlier in this section.
All companies indicated that ships would not be taken
out of service as a result of the user fee. In the immediate
future the present number of ships is needed to meet liner
schedules. These comments are consistent with the descriDtion
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of the liner trades presented in chapter V. Over the next
five to ten years some firms indicated that the number of
ships will be reduced as older ships are replaced with
larger ships. This is consistent with the history of the
Merchant Marine which has consistently witnessed smaller
ships replaced with larger ships and thus reducing the total
number of ships in service.
Ability to pass the fee on is a function of the trade
routes. On profitable routes where shipping conferences are
strong, steamship companies will be able to pass the user
fee on to shippers. On routes where conferences are weak,
officials indicated that the fee would probably be passed on,
however there was considerable uncertainty regarding this.
These comments harmonize with the descriptions of the liner
trade presented in chapter V. In addition, these comments
are supported by conference rate schedules examined by these
researchers. Conference rate schedules were examined at
steamship company offices and at the Federal Maritime Com-
mission Office located in Washington D.C. The rate schedules
contained many amendments that specified freight rate in-
creases due to increased fuel costs. Rate schedules are
large bound documents that specify rates for thousands of
different commodities. It is impractical to reproduce even
parts of these documents in this thesis. Increased costs
due to a user fee appears to be an analogous situation.
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All company officials indicated that because of the
small magnitude of the fee costs, conferences would not rush
to raise rates. Conference members meet at regular inter-
vals to discuss and set rates. The user fee costs would be
handled as a routine matter. For this reason, steamship
companies would have to absorb fee costs for some period of
time once the fee was enacted. Because the fee costs are
small it is possible that effects of the fee would be masked
by other factors such as changes in fuel prices. The esti-
mated fee costs and the description of the liner trade sup-
port these comments.
All officials interviewed stated the Coast Guard fee was
just the "tip of the iceberg" of a series of fees that are
being considered. Officials stated the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers are considering a user fee as are some local
governments. Although the magnitude of the Coast Guard fee
is small, a Corps of Engineers fee for dredging services and
a set of local user fees could easily result in total fee
costs that are double or triple the cost of the Coast Guard
fee. These researchers were able to confirm these plans for
Corps of Engineers and local government fees with Coast
Guard officials in Washington D.C.
In addition to user fees from other government agencies
in the U.S., officials were concerned with what they termed
"retaliation" on the part of other countries. All those
interviewed maintained that most foreign governments would
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enact a user fee in response to any fee enacted by the U.S.
government. In the process of enacting such a fee, many
countries would agree not to charge each other's ships.
Conferences would be reluctant to pass these costs on since
only American ships would be subject to the fee. This would
put U.S. ships at a competitive disadvantage. U.S. ships
would be paying the fee in each country along the trade
route while ships of other countries would only pay in the
United States. American steamship companies would therefore
have to absorb these costs which would be several times of
what the fee would be under the Coast Guard's proposal. Be-
cause of the Reagan Administration's distaste for subsidies,
steamship companies indicated they did not expect help from
the federal government in the form of higher operating-
differential subsidies. These thesis researchers were able
to confirm the statements regarding subsidies with a Mari-
time Administration official. The Reagan Administration has
mandated a freeze on further subsidies. Statements of com-
pany officials regarding ability to pass fees on or absorb
them as a result of retaliation are not adequately supported
by other aspects of this thesis. However, in chapter V it
was found that U.S. companies are able to exert considerable
influence along many of their routes due to preference car-
gos. Foreign flag operators generally go along with American
rates provided the trade is not strangled. To apply this
concept, one can consider a situation where U.S. firms pay a
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fee 10 times the estimated Coast Guard fee. As indicated
earlier in this section, fee costs as a percentage of total
revenues is less than .1% in all cases. A fee 10 times as
great would only account for 1% of revenues. A 1% increase
in charges to customers does not appear to have the capa-
bility to strangle the trade.
Carrying this analysis further one can estimate what 10
times the Coast Guard fee costs would do if the fee had to
be absorbed. Earlier in this section it was stated that
Coast Guard fee costs generally represented up to 2% of
company profits. A fee 10 times as great would represent 10
to 20% of company profits. It is not clear if this would be
difficult for companies to absorb.
It was not possible to confirm the possibility of re-
taliation in the event of a Coast Guard fee. Research into
the possibility of retaliation is beyond the scope of this
thesis
.
D. U.S. BULK CHARTER TRADE
All company officials indicated the proposed Coast Guard
user fee would create financial problems for their company.
Terms and conditions of charter contracts and a depressed
charter market are factors that make the user fee a problem
for this industry.
The Berger Group representative indicated that the terms
and conditions of the firm's charters prevented the company
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from passing fee costs on to customers. No additional data
provided by the Berger Group served to support or refute
this comment. A representative from the American Institute
of Merchant Shipping (AIMS) indicated that the terms and
conditions of most charters did allow fees to be passed on
to the charterers. She was somewhat incredulous when in-
formed of the Berger Group's comment. AIMS is a trade asso-
ciation that represents U.S. flag bulk and tanker operators.
It is interesting to note however that the Berger Group is
not a member of AIMS.
Keystone Shipping indicated there was a 50/50 chance of
passing the fee on to customers. Moore-McCormack indicated
that the terms and conditions of the present time charters
allowed fees to be passed on to the charterer. The research-
ers were unable to confirm these comments from other sources
All of the officials interviewed spoke of the overcapa-
city situation in the bulk carrier trade. In an overcapa-
city situation, operators are unable to cover fixed costs.
Overcapacity often forces shipowners to take ships out of
service. The user fee represents additional fixed costs
since all ships sail at least 5 times a year from U.S. ports
Additional fixed costs serve to aggravate the overcapacity
problem. These comments are supported by the description of
the charter trade provided in chapter V.
These researchers were unable to verify the overcapacity
situation with quantitative data. Such an attempt is beyond
139

the scope of this thesis. Lane Kendall, a noted expert in
maritime affairs, did however confirm the overcapacity situa-
tion for these researchers in an interview in April 1982.
Two of the firms indicated that the magnitude of fee
costs would be harmful. Financial data was not provided by
the Berger Group and Keystone Shipping to verify these
comments
.
For Moore-McCormack Bulk Transport, estimates of ocean
bulk operations show that fee costs are .4% or less of total
revenues and 1.3% or less of operating profits. The company
official indicated that during the period 1973 through 1980
these charges^ would have been passed on and would be con-
sidered small. The depressed condition of the market now
makes these charges significant. When present time charters
expire, it will be difficult to negotiate charters that will
cover costs. The user fee will aggravate this situation.
All of the companies spoke of possible retaliation on
the part of other countries in response to other fees enacted
by the U.S. government. Officials indicated that if the
Coast Guard fee didn't force them out of the business, fees
from other countries would. It was not possible to ascer-





Financial data and comments of company officials have
been compared and contrasted. In addition the history of
the Merchant Marine and the theories concerning the ocean
shipping market place have been applied to the case studies
In the next section we will draw some conclusions as to the
impact of the proposed Coast Guard user fee on the U.S. Mer-
chant Marine engaged in international trade.
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X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
To this point an analysis has been provided on the ef-
fects the proposed Coast Guard user fee will have on the
U.S. Merchant Marine engaged in international trade. The
analysis has included quantitative data such as financial
statements as well as qualitative factors such as the his-
tory of the U.S. Merchant Marine. The analysis has concen-
trated on the effects the fee will have on the profitability
of the firms. Conclusions will now be made from this analy-
sis as to how the fee will affect the number of firms and
the number of ships engaged in the trade.
It is concluded from this research effort that the num-
ber of firms and ships in the liner trades will not be af-
fected by the Coast Guard user fee. Liner vessels represent
over 80% of U.S. vessels engaged in international trade.
The primary reason for this conclusion is the magnitude of
fee costs. Fee costs are small in relation to revenues and
profits and therefore should not affect decision-making in
the industry.
On most trade routes fee costs will be passed to ship-
pers. If necessary, conferences can adjust fee related
freight increases to ensure all current customers continue
to have a competitive product in their overseas markets . It
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is very possible the user fee related increase will be masked
by other factors such as fuel price changes. On some trade
routes where conferences are weak, the fee cost may have to
be absorbed. This will not eliminate firms from providing
service along these routes. The U.S. bulk charter trade is
currently struggling with an overcapacity situation. For
this reason, the additional fixed costs represented by a
user fee will make the overcapacity problem more difficult
to deal with. It is unclear whether the user fee will de-
crease the number of firms and ships engaged in the bulk
trade. This is as much a function of the overcapacity prob-
lem as it is the user fee.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis uncovered several issues that should be re-
searched prior to enacting a user fee. First, research is
needed to study the possibility of retaliation as a result
of enactment of a user fee. Retaliation refers to a situa-
tion where other countries would enact a fee in response to
a Coast Guard user fee. The possibility of retaliation
bears some serious consequences for the U.S. Merchant Marine.
Secondly, additional research is needed into the cost of
the user fee in relation to profitability in the bulk charter
trade. Insufficient data was available to properly assess
the situation. The data is available at the Maritime Admini-
stration but could not be released to this research team.
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The federal government has spent millions of dollars to sup-
port a bulk charter trade. It is possible these efforts
will be undermined by a user fee.
Finally, research should be conducted into the possi-
bility of deferring user fee payments during bad years. The
bulk charter industry clearly has widely varying business
cycles. This is also evident to a lesser degree in the liner
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